

**An International Workshop in Kyoto:  
“Asian Analytic Philosophy and Contemporary Issues on Time”**

Date : 20<sup>th</sup> February, 2020

Venue : Center Room of Unit of Kyoto Initiatives for Humanities and Social  
Sciences, Faculty of Arts Bldg 4F, Main Campus, Kyoto University

**Timetable**

13:00–13:10	Opening Remark	
13:10–14:00	Shinya Moriyama Takeshi Sakon	Dōgen on Time and the Self
14:10–15:00	Yasuo Deguchi	Panchronic Self: The Temporal Mode of East Asian True Self
15:00–15:20	(Tea Time)	
15:20–16:10	Giuliano Torrenco	Presentness
16:20–17:10	Akiko Frischhut Giuliano Torrenco	Taste After Taste: The Temporality of Gustatory Experiences
17:10–17:20	Concluding Remark	

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## 1. Dōgen on Time and the Self

Shinya Moriyama and Takeshi Sakon

### Abstract

In this presentation, we examine Dōgen's paradoxical theses concerning time's passage, which appears in "Uji" chapter of his *Shōbōgenzō*. In one place, he denies the commonsense view that time passes, but in another place, he accepts time's aspect of coming and going. Although the two theses look incompatible indeed, there is a way to have a coherent interpretation of the two theses. The key is Dōgen's peculiar concept of the self. Unlike other no-self doctrine of Buddhism, his theory of no-self indicates not only the refutation of self as the independent subject but also the acceptance of self that is equal to the myriad of things existing as the manifestation of the Buddha-nature. When we look at our initial problem on the paradoxical theses again based on the above observation of Dōgen's theory of self, we can understand why he needs to describe time as possessing two different aspects.

## 2. Panchronic Self: The Temporal Mode of East Asian True Self

Yasuo Deguchi

### Abstract

There is an East Asian tradition of true self, according to which self is holistic, enactive and non-dual. The tradition has many variants such as Dōgen's self, Nishida's self as active intuition, and my idea of self: self-as-we. Then what temporal mode the East Asian true self have? Through examinations of Dōgen's self and my self-as-we, this talk tries to characterize it as panchronic or the temporality that isn't restricted to a specific point in time, rather than eternal, diachronic, synchronic or atemporal. It will also claim that such temporal mode can be experience by self through conceptual cultivation of our phenomenology or our first-person feeling that is formed by the concept of true self.

### 3. Presentness

Giuliano Torrengo

#### Abstract

Perceptual experiences seem to somehow contain information about their own temporal location: the present. However, the view that our perceptual experiences represent a sui generis property of presentness has been convincingly criticised in the literature (since Mellor 1998, Hestevold 1990). The baseline of the criticism is that to be experienced as present and to be experienced simpliciter are one and the same. Therefore, there is no reason to expect there is anything distinctive in the phenomenal character of our experiences that tells us that they occur in the present. At the same time, the temporal location of what we perceive do not seem to be inferred from other aspects of our mental life. I will defend a solution to this puzzle, in the form of an error-theoretic strategy based both on considerations concerning the transparency of temporal experience (cf. Soteriou 2013, Hoerl 2018) and insights from the literature on indexical thoughts (Perry 2013, Recanati 2007).

#### 4. Taste After Taste: The Temporality of Gustatory Experiences

Akiko Frischhut and Giuliano Torrengo

##### Abstract

When we eat we pass through many phases of our experience. Typically, we look at the food and smell it, we put it in our mouth, chew it, swallow it and... enjoy its aftertaste. Many of those phases are gustatory. In particular, we distinguish a “primary taste” phase and an “aftertaste phase”. We argue that aftertastes are unique because, contrary to other afterpercepts, such as for example afterimages, they are representational in the sense in which primary taste seems to be. This is remarkable because a) the food is no longer in the mouth and b) aftertaste often qualitatively differs from primary taste. This poses an intriguing philosophical problem: in what sense can aftertaste be accurately representing the food in my mouth which is no longer there and how can its gustatory representation differ from the primary taste and still be veridical? Our solution analyses the temporal profile of the entire experience with all its phases as representational experience. In so doing, it draws on a particular specious present account of temporal perception.