The territoriality and contextuality of a nation-state: Tensions and connections between Japan and East Asia

Revised from the presented paper:
Territoriality in trouble: Challenges to Japan from Northeast Asia

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Abstract

State centrism has been one of the fundamental paradigms in political science. In this paradigm, state sovereignty and territory tend to be regarded as exclusive and inviolable. From a territorial point of view, the possession of state territory constitutes the basis of sovereign rights. The control over the territory (e.g. border control) typically constitutes an act of a state to regulate social relations inside/outside its territory. Thus, the ability of the state apparatus to contain such relations is a prime function of territoriality.

   If we assume the state as an autonomous container, the dynamism of its growth and/or decline tends to be ascribed to various functions (territorialities) of the state itself. This, however, is hardly the case. Treating the state as a container neglects the real nature of the relations between states. In order to understand the interconnectedness of the modern world system, it becomes necessary to employ a perspective to recognize the multiplicity of states, nations, and territories or the geopolitical and geo-economic contexts in which a state is situated.

   Focusing on the territoriality and contextuality of a nation-state, this paper critically examines the New Right ideology to 'normalize' Japan as a nation-state and makes an attempt to 'resituate' Japan in the context of East Asia under the various influences of globalization.

Introduction

State centrism has been one of the fundamental paradigms in political science (Agnew 1994). In this paradigm, state sovereignty and territory tend to be regarded as exclusive and inviolable. From a territorial point of view, the possession of state territory constitutes the basis of sovereign rights. The control over the territory (e.g. border control) typically constitutes an act of a state to regulate social relations inside/outside its territory. Thus the ability of the state apparatus to contain such relations is a prime function of territoriality.

Peter Taylor (Taylor 1994), a British political geographer, employs Robert Sack's general definition of territoriality (Sack 1983) to argue that territory is directly linked to sovereignty to mold politics into a fundamentally state-centric social process and that the domination of political practice in the world by territoriality since the seventeenth century is a consequence of this territorial link between sovereign territory and national homeland. In explaining the functions of the modern nation-state, Taylor (1994) also refers to the container metaphor according to Anthony Giddens' concept of the state as a 'power container' (Giddens 1985).[1]

Although Taylor's container metaphor concisely theorizes the multiple functions of the nation-state, it considers the container a passive entity and is basically state-centric (Yamazaki 2002, 167). In his subsequent paper (Taylor 1995, 1), Taylor self-criticizes his container metaphor by stating, '[T]reating the state as a container neglects precisely the 'international'—the relations between states'. He argues that the metaphor does not extend to any notion of either a collectivity of states or plurality of nations and formulates the 'multiple' theory that helps to understand the multiplicity of states, nations, and territories. For him, these three basic components of the nation-state should be understood as 'internationality,' 'interstateness,' and 'interterritoriality.' I have found this 'multiple theory' helpful to understand and appreciate the interconnectedness of the modern world system.

Drawing on Taylor's container metaphor, I examined the policy changes of the Japanese government and Japan's New Right ideology (i.e. the combination of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, see Fyfe 1995) in an era of globalization and diverging territoriality (Yamazaki 2002). I argued that the rise of neo-conservatism in Japan was a geopolitical outcome of the Japanese inability to image a new space where they could resituate themselves in the Asia-Pacific context (Yamazaki 2002, 187). From a neo-conservative point of view, territorial sovereignty, military power, and national identity may be fundamental elements for (the restoration of) the Japanese nation-state. In reality, however, they are relative to other nation-states in the modern world system. On the other hand, Taylor's multiple theory gives a clue to put a nation-state in the context of its socio-historically inherent collectivity although he does not necessarily theorize such a 'contextuality.' In order to apply Taylor's thesis to a state such as Japan for an examination of the remaking of a contemporary nation-state, it becomes necessary not only to employ multiple theory

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[1] Taylor's container metaphor consists of two theses: 'filling the container' and 'a leaking container?' For the 'filling the container' thesis, Taylor (1994, 152) argues, '[T]he state has acted like a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality'. He presents four kinds of containers constructed through this filling process: power, wealth, culture and social containers. These containers correspond to the basic functions of the modern nation-state and have become its solid foundation. For the 'a leaking container?' thesis, Taylor suggests that the territorial integrity of these containers is/will be in question as seen in 'the end of the state' thesis. Each container, Taylor argues, is seeking different territoriality in the context of globalization. While the state as a power container is expected to continue, a wealth container tends to extend to a new larger economic bloc. A cultural container, on the other hand, faces fragmentation. As the result of this diverging triple territoriality, a social container as a unit of democracy, a basis of the welfare state, and a naturalized entity called 'society' is in confusion. See Yamazaki (2002, 166).

but also to develop it so as to explain the contextuality of a nation-state. Thus I concluded in my previous paper that an alternative to neo-conservatism would be a new perspective to resituate Japan not in closed containers but in the dynamic web of internationality, interstateness, and interterritoriality in the broader Asia-Pacific context and proposed to transcend the singularity of state theory and container metaphor (ibid).

Following the above-mentioned arguments and further developing the arguments I made in my previous paper (Yamazaki 2002), this paper critically examines the New Right ideology to 'normalize' Japan as a nation-state and makes an attempt to 'resituate' Japan in the context of East Asia under the various influences of globalization. In the following sections, I will first examine the deterritorializing processes of the Japanese economy and the prospect for the regional integration of East Asia, drawing on governmental reports concerning Japan's economic development in the region. Second, I will discuss the deepening of internationality or the increase of foreign nationals settled in Japan and illustrate some of the reactions of Japanese society to such a tendency or processes of re-nationalization. Third, I will show the continuing ambiguity of Japan's territory and the interterritoriality between Japan and Northeast Asia referring to recent territorial disputes. Finally, I will point out the growing disparity between the contextual reality over Japan and the ideological illusion of the nation-state and suggest how Japan as a state can be redefined and resituated in East Asia.

Deterritorialization of Japan's economy and reterritorialization of East Asia

As I argued in my previous paper (Yamazaki 2002, 169), the New Right ideology spreading through developed countries since the 1980s contains important political economic tensions between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism (Fyfe 1995). Whereas neo-liberalism attempts to promote individualism, market society, and minimal government in economic matters, neo-conservatism emphasizes collectivism (nation), disciplined society and strong government in political matters. The economic and the political in the New Right ideology are not separated from but complementary to each other due to the nature of the modern world system that consists of a single world market and a multiple state system (Taylor and Flint 2000, 11).

In territorial terms, capitalist territoriality constantly deterritorializes and reterritorializes the wealth container of the nation-state while state power is forced to adjust to the evolving dynamics of the capitalist world economy (Ó Tuathail 2000, 169). So the ways the nation-state adjusts to these de/reterritorializing processes can also be territorial or the exercises of territoriality since one of the fundamental bases of state power is based on state territory. Therefore, I begin with an argument about the interaction between capitalist and state territoriality as one of the causes of the tensions in the New Right ideology.

Given the physical stasis or fixity of state territory, the interaction between capitalist and state territoriality inevitably contains aspects of spatiality. In other words, the interaction actually emerges from the geographical location of a state or states. Any arguments about state trade policies cannot help mentioning the geographical location of the pertinent state(s). This condition makes it necessary for us to take the spatial context of a nation-state into account. Moreover, according to Taylor's multiple theory of the nation-state, the historical constructiveness of nation-states requires us to consider the temporal context of a nation-state. Thus we need to resituate a nation-state in a space-time context, which is applied to the following description of Japan's economic territoriality.

In the late 1990s, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) pointed

out that economic globalization had firmly tied Japan to other East Asian countries and regions[2] by creating an economic division of labor and interdependency between Japan and these economies.[3] The major actor in this process was the foreign direct investment (FDI) of Japan-based transnational corporations. Since 1990, the Japanese FDI has been actively spreading over East Asian emerging markets. Since the second half of the 1980s, East Asia had been the biggest destination of Japan's export. The origins of Japan's imports had also been concentrated in East Asia.[4] Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (hereafter METI, METI 2005) shows that Japan's FDI towards East Asia increased 10.8 times over the past 15 years, with an annual average of 800 billion yen in funds flowing into East Asia. In particular, Japanese companies are increasingly locating themselves in China.

Therefore, East Asia has been increasingly becoming an important 'wealth container' for Japan's economy (Yamazaki 2002: 173-175). *Keizai kenkyujo* (The Economic Research Institute) of the Economic Planning Agency observed that the rapid economic growth in East Asia had strengthened intra-regional linkages in trade, investment, finance, capital and labor.[5] In addition to this regional interdependency based on the Japanese FDI, the Japanese government had strategically increased official development assistance (ODA)[6] and promoted trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific realm since the end of the Cold War. As a major regional power replacing the US, Japan has been increasing its political economic influence over the realm.

In parallel with the increasing economic linkage between Japan and East Asia, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI 2005) recently expressed concerns about the twin deficits of the U.S. economy and the overheating of the Chinese economy. An emphasis is placed on the necessity to achieve self-reliant economic growth in East Asia and shift from a unipolar structure dependent on U.S. consumption to a multi-polar structure including East Asia and Europe. METI (2005: 255-265) recognizes the trade structure underlying East Asian growth as an advancement of cross-industrial "Triangular Trade Structure". The basic patterns of the triangular trade are that the high added-value parts, components, and processed goods produced by Japan and the NIEs are imported by China and ASEAN where wages are low and that these goods are then converted into final goods through assembly production and exported to final consumption markets such as the U.S. and Europe.

With regard to Japan's domestic structural change (i.e. declining and aging population), METI (2005) recommends the utilization of human resources at home and abroad. As will be discussed below, the increasing migration pressure on Japan from East Asia requires effective measures to deal not only with external migration pressure but also with the shrinking domestic population. Rather than a simple importation of foreign workers, METI points out the increasing importance of a bilateral economic partnership (i.e. Economic Partnership Agreement, EPA) with East Asia as seen with Singapore and the Philippines. Responding to deterritorializing economy and labor inflow, it has become necessary for Japan to implement more realistic and effective institutions to sustain its economy and society.

Following the arguments about EPA, METI (2005) examines the possibility of regional

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[2] Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI 2005) defines East Asia as the region consisting of Japan, China, ASEAN4 (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia), and NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore).

[3] MITI (1999).

[4] O'Loughlin and Anselin (1996).

[5] *Keizai kenkyujo* (1996).

[6] Clear regional emphases are placed on Asia in Japan's ODA strategies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA 2003). See also Grant (1995) and Grant and Nijman (1997).

institutional integration in East Asia. As mentioned above, within East Asia de facto economic relations are becoming closer. METI (2005: 436-437) points out that East Asia's intra-regional trade ratio is higher than NAFTA's and is approaching the level of EU's, which is promising that developing an institutional framework to facilitate and revitalize economic activities will further promote the economic prosperity of East Asia.

However, there are structural obstacles to such a regional integration in this region; the most obvious one is extremely large intra-regional disparities. In order to provide support for the development of the economic and social infrastructure of countries within the region that are not yet prepared for the institutionalization of economic integration, METI (2005: 456) proposes that Japan make strategic use of ODA to assist in establishing a trade and investment environment and economic infrastructure that will make intra-regional economic partnerships more effective. Therefore, METI puts an importance on developing bilateral EPA or FTA in East Asia as a step towards a multilateral integration such as the East Asian Community.

With regard to the East Asian Community concept, METI (2005: 503-504) considers the framework of the East Asian Summit[7] as a basis for such a concept. However, two important issues to be faced to create a Community are presented. First, it would be difficult to regulate the framework of the East Asian Summit due to the problems in allocating rights to member countries and in coordinating the relationship between the Summit, ASEAN+3, and other member countries.

Second, the scope of "East Asia" can be problematic. For Japan, the exclusion of the U.S. means to set aside the biggest demand absorber for East Asia. METI (2005: 504) argues that the military presence of the U.S. in the region constitutes the uniform regional order. For China, Russia needs to be included probably due to the U.S. presence and its rivalry with Japan. Thus consensus has not been reached concerning how to define the relationship with members from outside the ASEAN region. In the worst case, the East Asian Summit could become a stage for the hegemonic competition between regional powers such as Japan, China, and ASEAN.

As often mentioned by METI (2005: 504) and some authors (e.g. Murphy 1996), there is not much of a common historical and cultural foundation in East Asia. Admitting that developing a "sense of community" by creating a shared regional identity based on common values and principles is not at all easy task, METI (2005: 506) mentions "some observers have indicated that a "zone with a common culture" is being formed in East Asia through the emergence of the urban middle class and the increasingly active intra-regional cultural exchange resulting from this."

Although the prospect of the East Asian Community remains to be seen, any measure for the reterritorialization of East Asia is a logical consequence of the interaction between capitalist and state territorialities. As long as such reterritorialization is a way of state capitalist accumulation, this process contains aspects of spatiality, reflecting the location of pertinent state(s). Such spatiality then conditions various flows of capital, commodity, labor, information, etc. Given that any state, more or less, needs to deal with such inter-related territorializing processes, the nature of the interstateness among pertinent states is inevitably affected by and/or shifts in accordance with the processes.

The 'deepening' internationality and re-nationalization of Japan

Taylor argues that modern politics has operated through multiple nations each defining an 'us' that opposes multiple 'thems'. For him, the definition of a nation as opposed to other nations is the

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[7] Member countries include ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea), India, Australia, and New Zealand. The first Summit was held in December 2005.

hallmark of internationality (Taylor 1995, 7). He also points out that the idea that only large nations would qualify for their own states has not operated in the twentieth century resulting in claims to statehood coming from smaller groups (Taylor 1995, 8). In this respect, as seen in his argument about "cultural container" (Taylor 1994), he seems to regard internationality as a rather segregated coexistence of distinctive nations. Therefore, such coexistence does not necessarily lead to "trans-nationality" but reproduces itself (Taylor 1995, 12).

However, in the case of Japan and East Asia, the interrelations between nations are neither "international" nor "trans-national" in Taylor's terms. Despite the increase in the number of foreign nationals residing in Japan, the 'internal' boundaries on Japanese nationhood have been relatively maintained within Japan's territory. I call this situation 'deepening' internationality. There are two reasons for this. One is that the Nationality Law in Japan is based on "blood," which functions to reproduce internationality within Japan. The other is that foreign nationals are not necessarily naturalized in Japan. Unlike the increasing number of registered foreign nationals in Japan as shown below, the number of foreign applicants for naturalization does not have any constant tendency but varies yearly from 1996-2005 (*Homusho* 2006). During this period, the largest number was 17,486 in 1998, and the lowest was 13,344 in 2002. The yearly average is 15,451. That of naturalized foreign nationals in the same period is 15,512.[8]

In order to examine the degree of internationality of Japan, I employ the data of foreign nationals entering and residing in Japan. According to *Immigration Control 2005* (Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, IBMOJ 2005), foreign nationals entering Japan have constantly increased in number for the past few decades with the exception of 2003 when the war on Iraq and the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in Asia took place. In 2004 the number reached 6,756,830 due to the increase of tourists.

Visitors from Asia accounted for 68.2% (4,607,027) in 2004 followed by those from North America (14.1%), Europe (12.2%), Oceania (3.5%), South America (1.6%), and Africa (0.4%). By nationality (place of origin), the largest number of foreign nationals came from South Korea (1,774,872) accounting for 26.3% of the total, which was followed by Taiwan, the U.S., China, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. 53.8% of the foreign nationals entering Japan came from South Korea, Taiwan, and China. The comparison between 2003 and 2004 shows that visitors from these three neighboring regions increased by 9.4% in 2004. On the other hand, according to the research by Japan Tourist Marketing Co. (2006), the largest (estimated) number of Japanese tourists visited the U.S. (3,883,906) in 2005, followed by China (3,389,976), South Korea (2,439,809), Hong Kong (1,210,848), and Taiwan (1,127,184). These statistical facts indicate that the international human interaction (mostly tourist flow in this case) between Japan and the rest of the world has been highly concentrated in South Korea, Taiwan, and China.

While the above-mentioned data show foreign nationals entering Japan as temporary visitors, the data for the foreign nationals 'registered' in Japan indicate those who stay in Japan for a relatively long period of time as special permanent residents, students, employees, or Japanese' spouses. They are 'settled' in the local community to varying degrees. An examination of these data shows us how internationality has been deepened within Japan.

The total number of registered foreign nationals residing in Japan has been increasing. It reached 1,973,747 in 2004 constituting 1.55% of the total population of Japan (127,687,000). Its regional breakdown by place of origin shows that 74.2% (1,464,360) of the registered foreign

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[8] The number of those naturalized sometimes exceeds that of applicants due to the fact that the reviewing process of applications does not necessarily end by the end of the year. In terms of nationality, the yearly average of naturalized Koreans is 10,102 while that of naturalized Chinese is 4,601, indicating the stronger tendency of Koreans to be naturalized.

nationals were from Asia, followed by South America (18.1%, 358,211), North America (3.3%, 64,471), and Europe (3.0%, 58,429). As a result of Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula, North and South Koreans (30.8%, 607,419) have been the largest sub-group of the registered foreign nationals. However, while the number of this sub-group has gradually decreased, that of Chinese (24.7%, 487,570) has increased dramatically. The numbers of Brazilians (14.5%, 286,557), Filipinos (10.1%, 199,394), and Peruvians (2.8%, 55,750) have also been increasing. Brazilians and Peruvians have included a significant amount of Japanese descendents since Japanese descendents can become legal workers in the current law. The decrease of Koreans is not only relative due to the increase of the other nationals, but also absolute due to the naturalization of Koreans.[9] Therefore, the recent internationalization of Japanese society has been deepened through foreign residences from East Asia and South America, especially the former.

The domestic distribution of the registered foreign nationals has relatively clear geographical patterns. Koreans, whose first generation came to Japan before 1945 and many of whom were born and raised in Japan, are concentrated mainly in the Kansai Region including major cities such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe Cities. Chinese recently began to live in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area due to the opportunities for study and work. Brazilians and Peruvians tend to be settled in industrial areas such as the Tokai Region, which provide them with job opportunities as factory workers. The internationalization of Japanese society is now in progress at the local level.

In addition to deepening internationality within Japan, the process of trans-nationality is definitely under way. An index of trans-nationalization is mixed marriage, or what is called "international marriage" in Japan.[10] The ratio of mixed marriage (i.e. either of the spouses is a foreign national) to the total number of the marriages registered in Japan increased from 0.44% (4,156 cases) in 1965 to 5.48% (39,511 cases) in 2004 (*Kosei rodo sho* 2004).

It is important to note that the mixed marriage in Japan has clear gender biases. As of 2004, the number of cases where a husband was Japanese amounted to 30,907 accounting for 78.2% of the total mixed marriages in Japan while that of the opposite cases were 8,604 (21.8%). The nationalities of foreign wives were Chinese (38.6%), Filipino (27.2%), and Korean (18.5%). In the opposite cases, the husbands' nationalities were Korean (26.7%), American (17.4%), and Chinese (12.8%). Thus the internationalization of Japanese society will proceed at the micro level of household and have a significant generational effect on the future Japanese population and its ethnic composition.

The regional breakdown of these data (*Kosei rodo sho* 2004) shows that mixed marriages were concentrated particularly in the Kanto and Tokai Regions centering on Tokyo and Nagoya respectively and that there were localized concentrations in such prefectures as Yamagata and Nagano. It seems that the recruitments of Asian brides for depopulated rural villages influenced the latter case. At the city level, high ratios of mixed marriage were seen in major cities in Japan such as the 23 special wards of Tokyo (10.4%), Osaka City (8.9%), Chiba City (8.1%), and Nagoya City (7.7%). It can be said from this that Japanese major cities have played a role as a gate for the internationalization of Japanese society. In short, the deepening of internationality in Japan will surely proceed as the East-Asianization of Japanese society.

In terms of international migration and globalization, Saskia Sassen (Sassen 1996: 59-60) contrasts 'economic denationalization' with 'political renationalization'. Economic globalization denationalizes national economies while immigration causes the state to renationalize

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[9] See note 8.
[10] "International" marriage such as this does not necessarily represent a process of trans-nationality in Taylor's terms but creates a process of transforming the integrity of Japan's nation through issues such as dual citizenship, social multilingualism, and multicultural public education.

its politics. Sassen argues that the nation-state lifts border controls for the flow of capital, information and services for further globalization but that it claims its older splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders against immigrants and refugees. This renationalization can be considered a kind of reterritorialization to secure territorial sovereignty for the nation-state.

According to IBMOJ (2005: 43), the estimated number of overstayers (those who illegally stay in Japan beyond the permitted period of stay without obtaining permission for the extension or change of status for residence) was 207,299 in 2005. This number has been decreasing since it reached 298,646 in 1993. IBMOJ attributes this significant decrease not only to Japan's continuing economic stagnancy but also to the comprehensive measures taken by the Bureau against illegal foreign residents such as "Five-Year Plan to Halve the Number of Illegal Immigrants" started in 2004. Governmental border controls have been strengthened and become highly selective to exclude illegal migrants.

In conjunction with the stricter border controls after 9/11, the crime prevention by Japanese police has targeted foreign nationals temporarily staying in Japan. As the population of foreign nationals has increased, the internationalization of crimes has gained popular attention since the mid-1990s. According to the National Police Agency (*Keisatsucho* 2006), the ratio of the number of foreign nationals temporarily staying in Japan (8,505) to the total number of arrested general criminals (386,955) in 2005 is 2.2%, but the number of such foreign criminals began to increase and reached a historically high in 2004 after it had been recorded as the lowest during the past decade in 1998. The National Police Agency (ibid) also points out that the crimes conducted by foreign nationals temporarily staying in Japan are spreading nation-wide. By nationality, 44% of the arrested foreign general criminals were Chinese followed by Brazilians (12.5%). Chinese tend to commit burglary and forgery while Brazilians thief without breaking-in. The fact that many Chinese commit crimes in Japan has contributed to the negative perception of their existence among Japanese as shown in the following section, leading to the worsening of Japanese public perception of China.

Although the issue of the crime prevention committed by foreign nationals has developed into a social problem, the exclusionary atmosphere of Japanese society against them has not been enhanced due to the facts that Japan's border and immigration controls have been tight, that the number of foreign residents have been increasing but are still small, and that Japan's cultural homogeneity has remained high. Its highly selective immigration control will keep the nationality/ethnic composition of foreign residents diverse rather than limited to a few. Such control will also be seen in the introduction of foreign high-skilled labor through EPA's with Asian countries as a measure countering Japan's depopulation. In any case, it is undeniable that Japan's internationality will be deepened.

Japan's ambiguous territoriality and 'internationalism' in East Asia

By interterritoriality, Taylor indicates the presumption that every section of occupied land across the world is the sovereign territory of some state (Taylor 1995, 3). I agree with Taylor that this is an ideal-typical presumption of the current interstate system, but this is hardly the case for many states. Rather, overlapping territories have caused severe international disputes and conflicts and destabilized interstateness in some parts of the world. In the case of Japan, as I argued in my previous paper (Yamazaki 2002), the power container or state territory of Japan has maintained its ambiguity due to the postwar Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the heavy U.S. military presence (i.e. extraterritoriality). In addition to this, the return of the Northern Territories from the former Soviet Union had been an important unresolved territorial dispute for Japan until today. As

will be examined below, other potentially disputable territories with neighboring countries had long been suppressed in Japan's foreign policy.

Let us first look at the territoriality of the postwar Japan-U.S. security arrangements. After the Second World War, Japan was completely disarmed and incorporated into the Western capitalist bloc through the U.S. occupation. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements were formally established in 1951 when the Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were concluded. The current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty determines two important obligations for both countries. Article 5 of the Treaty requires that the U.S. defend Japan, which implies that an armed attack on Japan would result in a military confrontation with the U.S., and, therefore, means that for Japan the Treaty possesses power as a deterrent. Article 6, conversely, requires Japan to provide the U.S. with areas and facilities so that the U.S. can station its military forces within Japan, particularly in Okinawa, an islands' prefecture located at the southern fringe of Japan. This 'mutual' relationship has sustained Japan's constitutional pacifism and relatively non-aggressive Self Defense Forces on the one hand and the U.S.' forward deployment in East Asia on the other. The deployment of the U.S. military force has also been considered as playing an important role in maintaining a military balance among East Asian countries.

As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War necessitated a reexamination of the conventional Japan-U.S. security arrangements which were based on a bipolar world. After close consultation between Japan and the U.S., the two states announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996. Recognizing that instabilities and uncertainties would continue to exist in the Asia-Pacific region, the two states reconfirmed in the Declaration that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would remain the cornerstone in the maintenance of a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region into the 21st century (Japan Defense Agency, JDA 2002, 97).

The Declaration redefined the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as maintaining the existing security arrangements not only for Japan's security, but also for the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The sphere which the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would influence was also correspondingly enlarged from the territory of Japan to the Asia-Pacific region. This indicates that the Japan-U.S. political economic alliance reconstructed the division of labor and cooperation in the region after the Cold War (Grant and Nijman 1997). Thus, the end of the Cold War did not significantly change the nature of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Rather, the alliance between the two countries was reinforced against newly-emerging instabilities and uncertainties in the post-9/11 world.

After 9/11, the reinforced Japan-U.S. security arrangements entered a new stage. For the U.S., East Asia became one of the important strategic areas. Following 9/11, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) paid particular attention to East Asia (U.S. Department of Defense, USDOD 2001). In addition to China being depicted as the U.S.' new 'military rival', North Korea was listed as a member of 'an axis of evil' (Bush 2002). In this new context of the 'war on terror', the Bush Administration has given new security implications to East Asia[11] (USDOD 2005, 29-30). Therefore, through the postwar Japan-U.S. security arrangements, Japan's national security has been tightly incorporated into the geopolitical pasture of the global U.S. military presence.

In light of Taylor's argument about power container, the territoriality of postwar Japan as a power container has been ambiguous due to the U.S. military presence within Japan. In order to take advantage of their deterrence, Japan allows foreign military forces to be stationed within its sovereign territory. With regard to the recent geopolitical context of East Asia, the launch of long-range missiles from North Korea in 1998 (and 2006) and the Japan Coast Guard's warning

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[11] The latest QDR (USDOD 2005, 29-30) expressed growing concerns about China rather than North Korea.

attacks against unidentified (allegedly North Korean) ships violating Japan's territorial waters in 1999 (with the SDF) and 2002 increased governmental and public awareness of the importance of territorial defense. Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase of the newspaper coverage on North Korea's conducts. This can constitute the reason why Japan's dependence on the U.S. military forces for deterrence should remain intact. The results of the public opinion survey from the late 1990s indicate that in accordance with increasing public concerns about territorial security, public reliance on the current Japan-U.S. security arrangements has been increasing.[12] In other words, Japan's territorial security will be maintained as a form of extraterritoriality of the U.S. within Japan.

Another important aspect of actual interterritoriality is territorial dispute. The concept of sovereign territory implies that the state is entitled to exercise exclusive sovereign rights over its territory. However, the actual arrangement of state territories is not necessarily mutually exclusive. Thus territorial disputes can occur over overlapped territories and unsettled boundaries. Even though the territory of Japan has been surrounded by sea since it lost its colonies in 1945, it has had territorial disputes with neighboring countries: the Northern Territories with Russia, the Senkaku Islands with China (and Taiwan), and Takeshima Island with South Korea (Figure 2). Relations between Japan and these countries over disputed territories (islands) have been tense since the second half of the 1990s.

A rough content analysis on the coverage of the *Asahi Shimbun* shows that each territorial issue had been covered differently over the period from 1985-2005 (Figure 3). The most noticeable fact is that the issue of the Northern Territories had been covered much more frequently than those with East Asian countries. Such coverage drastically increased in accordance with the demise of the Soviet Union but seems to be reported 'consistently' in the newspaper. On the other hand, the coverage of territorial issues with East Asian countries increased in 1996 when Japan formally established its own Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) by ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The demarcation of the EEZ is based on the boundary of territorial water, which is necessarily connected to the issues of disputed territories. However, unlike the coverage of the Northern Territories, that of Takashima or the Senkaku Islands appeared rather 'sporadically' or 'sensationally,' indicating that territorial disputes or interterritoriality among East Asian countries have not necessarily been mentioned on a daily basis in the newspaper.[13]

Given that territory is a crucial component for the rise of nationalism (Knight 1982; 1984; Passi 1996; Yamazaki 2003), it is likely that the nature of interterritoriality concerning particular states affects the construction of nationalism in each state. Although it is not an easy task to describe how Japanese postwar nationalism has been constructed through the above-mentioned territorial disputes, I attempt to suggest a few important aspects of it using the recent public opinion surveys on international relations in East Asia. I used the results of two public opinion surveys. One is that conducted by the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan (*Naikakufu* 1995, 2005), and the other is by *Nippon resachi senta* (2005a, b). According to the results of the former (Figure 4), the Japanese tendency to feel closer to the U.S. and Western Europe than to East Asia was maintained, but the feeling towards East Asia was generally improved with the exception of the increasing negative perception of China. *Nippon resachi senta* (2005a, b) show that inter-perceptions between Japan and South Korea and between Japan and China are not very good (Table 1). At the perceptual level of respondents, there are two possible reasons for this: one is

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[12] According to the national public opinion survey (*Naikakufu* 2003, 2006), 63.5% of the respondents considered the Japan-U.S. security arrangements useful. The ratio continued to increase to 75.1% in 2006.

[13] The opposite case is the *Sankei Shimbun* which published a series of articles to point out the weak territorial consciousness of the Japanese (*Sankei Shimbun* 1997).

Japan's 'official' reinterpretation of the Asia-Pacific War represented by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni (War) Shrine; and the other is the above-mentioned territorial disputes between the three countries (Tables 2 and 3).

According to Figure 4 and Table 1, Japanese respondents have not necessarily maintained a negative feeling towards China and South Korea. Whereas the anti-Japanese sentiments of China and South Korea are rather constant, the recent worsening of Japanese feeling towards these countries was mainly brought about by knowing that anti-Japanese sentiments were growing in China and South Korea such as seen in the first half of 2005. I argue that on the other hand, the growth of such antagonistic sentiments in neighboring countries stems partially from the 'tough' diplomatic attitude of the Koizumi Cabinet towards China and South Korea. The reasons why Chinese and South Korean respondents do not feel so close to Japan are that they believe that there are differences between them and Japanese over the perception of the colonial past and territorial issues (Table 2). Thus the recent relations (interstateness) between Japan and the other two countries tend to fuel nationalistic sentiments on the latter side. Given that the processes of postwar decolonization and the state-formation of China and South Korea have been closely connected to the evaluation of Japan's imperialism, Japan's reevaluation of its own colonial past, if expressed in an official form, inevitably affects the construction of Chinese and Korean national identity. This linkage of anti-Japanese sentiments with the concept of history and territory indicates how Chinese and Korean national identities have been constructed in relation to Japan as their 'other.'

Japanese public responses to the growth of such anti-Japanese sentiments have peculiar aspects. It is clear from Table 1 that the worsening of Japan's reputation negatively affects Japanese feeling towards China and South Korea in a significant way. However, the fact that many Japanese respondents answered "Do not know" implies that they were puzzled over how they should accept such nationalistic sentiments in neighboring countries. In this sense, the rise of historical and/or territorial nationalisms in China and South Korea may not directly lead to the construction of counter-nationalism in Japan, but the maintaining of an antagonistic relationship between these nations may affect the reconstruction of Japanese national identity under way (Yamazaki 2002, 181-186). Thus I term this inter-ness in the construction of nationalism 'internationalism'. I argue that any movements for state formation or nation-building are likely to have something to do with internationalism in the sense that 'us' cannot be identified without specifying 'thems' (Taylor 1995, 7). 'We' cannot be alone in the modern world system and, therefore, need a geo-historical context in which we can be 'us'.

Conclusion: the reality and ideology of the nation-state

As I argued in my previous paper (Yamazaki 2002), the New Right ideology clearly emerged in Japanese state politics in the second half of the 1990s after the socio-political unrest in the middle of the decade. I identified its emergence in the LDP-led Obuchi Cabinet from 1998-2000. After the Mori Cabinet (2000-2001) abruptly succeeded Obuchi due to his sudden death, Prime Minister Koizumi appeared from Mori's faction in the highly populist atmosphere.[14] It seems that Koizumi also devoted himself to the development of the New Right ideology in Japan in the recovery of Japan's neo-liberal economy, the participation of Japan's SDF in the U.S. military campaign against

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[14] According to the public opinion surveys by the *Asahi Shimbun*, Koizumi achieved the highest rate of support (84%) in May 2005 one month after his inauguration, and the average rate of support for him is 50% during his terms from 2001-2006, which is the second highest of the postwar Japanese Prime Ministers.

Afghanistan and Iraq (see Yamazaki 2006), and the reinterpretation of Japan's militarist past.

I argued that neo-conservatism in Japan would seek to restore Japan's constitutional, military, and national subjectivity (Yamazaki 2002). At a glance, the politics Koizumi pursued represents such restoration. His 'tough' posture against China and South Korea, particularly the former, seems to be a kind of performance to signify Japan's subjectivity in the domain of interstateness. However, his foreign policy has been rather subject to that of the U.S. as seen in Japan's swift cooperation with the U.S. military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore I argue that neo-conservatism as promoted by Koizumi is diplomatically selective. It may insist on restoring Japan's subjectivity against Northeast Asia but not against the U.S. It may express some frustration with the imposition of the current Constitution on Japan by the U.S. but not overtly criticize the U.S. postwar hegemony in the West Pacific. Thus it can be said that the interterritoriality and internationality between Japan and neighboring countries have contributed to the recent selective reconstruction of Japanese subjectivity and national identity.

As Taylor (1994) points out the processes of globalization or detteritorialization make it increasingly difficult to contain particular socio-economic processes within a state territory. In order to understand and cope with the complexity of the processes that Japan is facing, it becomes necessary to resituate Japan in the time-space context of East Asia by employing the perspective of the multiplicity of nation-states, rather than drawing on the classic singular model of the nation-state. As I have argued, Japan's political economy has been embedded in East Asia and has influenced domestic socio-economic issues and public opinions accordingly. Without understanding such political economic contextuality, it would be difficult to shape any effective foreign/domestic policy. When we discuss Japan's foreign/domestic policy or national identity politics in the context of East Asia, one criterion for such policy or politics would be how capable it is of the interconnectedness with other nations, states, and territories surrounding Japan.

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Figure 1. Newspaper coverage on North Korea's conducts from 1985-2005.

Note: Shown are the numbers of articles containing three (combinations of) words: *tepodon* (Taepodong), *fushinsen* (suspicious boat) & *kitachosen* (North Korea), and *rachi* (abduction) & *kitachosen* (North Korea). Source: *Asahi shimbun sha* (2006).

Figure 2. Japan's territorial water, EEZ, and disputed territories (islands).

Notes: A: The Northern Territories, B: Takashima Island, C: The Senkaku Islands.
Base map: http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/~honkawa/9410.html (accessed 17 September 2006).

Figure 3. Newspaper coverage on disputed territories from 1985-2005.

Note: Shown are the numbers of articles containing three (combinations of) words: *takeshima* & *ryodo* (territory), *senkaku* & *ryodo* (territory), and *hoppo ryodo* (Northern Territories).
Source: *Asahi shimbun sha* (2006).

Figure 4. Japanese' felt closeness to other countries/regions in 1995 and 2005.

Sources: *Naikakufu* (1995, 2005).

Table 1. Inter-perceptions between three countries in 2002 and 2005.

Chinese to Japan   %

	Do not feel close	Feel close	Do not know/NA
2002	66.5	25.5	8.0
2005	71.1	16.0	13.0

Japanese to China   %

	Do not feel close	Feel close	Do not know/NA
2002	42.7	54.8	8.0
2005	56.9	16.1	26.7

South Koreans to Japan   %

	Do not feel close	Feel close	Do not know/NA
2001	69.4	30.0	0.6
2005	79.3	17.9	2.8

Japanese to South Korea   %

	Do not feel close	Feel close	Do not know/NA
2001	42.2	53.1	4.7
2005	41.1	32.0	27.0

Sources: *Nippon resachi senta* (2005a, b).

Table 2. Three reasons for NOT feeling close to other countries in 2002 and 2005.

Not feeling close to Japan/China due to:		%
	Chinese	Japanese
Perception of history	69.2	44.4
Territorial issue	50.6	34.4
Anti-Japanese/Chinese sentiment	47.4	76.0

Not feeling close to Japan/South Korea due to:		%
	South Koreans	Japanese
Perception of history	78.2	43.6
Territorial issue	87.4	45.1
Anti-Japanese/Korean sentiment	66.4	66.8

Sources: *Nippon resachi senta* (2005a, b).

Table 3. Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni (War) Shrine.

	Approve	Object	Do not know/NA %
Chinese	3.0	82.2	14.8
South Koreans	14.2	76.9	8.8
Japanese	35.4	35.2	29.3

Sources: *Nippon resachi senta* (2005a, b).