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Global military deployment, urban protest, and the framing of discontent:
The case of Okinawa, Japan

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the postwar global deployment of U.S. military forces, local protest against it, and protesters' framing of their discontent. Using the case of postwar Okinawa, Japan where U.S. military forces have been stationed since 1945, the author collected the official (published) statements of local protesters and analyzed them so that it could be clarified how they accused U.S. military presence in East Asia as well as Okinawa and justified their protest in universal terms. While their protest actions were staged in the local context, meaning that they first utilized urban hierarchy to maximize public support and later became more militant to directly sabotage military exercises near U.S. bases, protest organizers discursively sought to ascribe the causes of their actions to globalized principles such as the United Nations' declarations on human rights and decolonization. Such discursive practices attempt to frame local discontent against global oppression using counter-geopolitical imaginations. This paper shows how important it is for local protesters to construct their actions at multiple scales: to understand the geopolitical location of their locality, utilize the geography of the locality, and justify their actions in counter-geopolitical terms.

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has deployed its military forces globally to contain and reduce the threats posed by its 'enemies' such as the Former Soviet Union, China, and currently terrorists. Shortly after the end of the War, the forward deployment of U.S. military forces came to have a truly 'global' nature and continues to do so until today. From 1950-2005, 54 countries hosted at least 1,000 U.S. troops with dramatic regional variations (Kane 2006). After constructing and maintaining a bloc of friendly states during the Cold War, the U.S. is now seeking to build geo-strategic networks that can protect its own political economic interests in, and deal with 'asymmetrical threats' stemming from, every corner of the globe. Even though the material and financial rationalization of this forward deployment and the strengthening of 'homeland security' have been discussed after 9/11 (Isenberg 2002; Isenberg and Eland 2002; Nider 2002, 2004; Kelly 2003; Tama 2009), the global presence of U.S. military forces does not seem to lose its primary importance for the security of many states (Scales and Wortzel 1999; O'Hanlon 2005; Baldauf 2007; Biddle 2008; Gonzales 2009). This is a major reason why the global scale of U.S. military presence has been constructed and maintained by those states as well as the U.S. itself.

However, U.S. military presence is not only the matter at the global scale, but also takes place in particular localities within particular states. Since the offshore stationing of U.S. troops is a result of the geopolitical agreements between the U.S. and host states, it partially reflects the security concerns of the states. Moreover, U.S. troops thus deployed need to be stationed in particular localities within the states. U.S. military presence is also a local matter or, more exactly, a local manifestation of national and international security concerns. Therefore, it can be considered a multi-scalar phenomenon with various socio-political effects.

One of such socio-political effects is political struggle against U.S. military presence. Despite the arguments for their presence on foreign soil, the offshore stationing of U.S. military forces is not necessarily welcome by host societies. It has often brought about political opposition and resistance from local residents and antiwar activists. Protests against U.S. military presence have developed in countries such as Spain, Ecuador, Italy, Paraguay, Uzbekistan, and Bulgaria while longer-term resistance movements have continued in regions such as South Korea, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Cuba, Europe, and Japan (Dufour 2007). Drawing on this aspect, this paper sets its research questions concerning *how such political struggle is organized spatially or geographically* and *what kind of implications the spatiality or geography of struggle have to the understanding of social movement*.

In the studies of social movement little attention has been paid to its spatial or geographical dimensions (McAdam and Snow 1997; Snow, Soul, and Kriesi 2007). This is mainly because such spatial or geographical dimensions tend to be considered less significant than other social, organizational, and psychological dimensions (*ibid.*; Gould 1991). However, there is a

growing interest in such aspects in recent years, particularly the significance of place-based social movement (Miller 2000, Escobal 2001, Miller 2007). And the location strategies of social movement organizations (SMOs) and activist groups are not necessarily negligible because they often need to use public space to demonstrate their discontent, justify their struggle, make an appeal to the public, or mobilize their sympathizers. In order to maximize the impact of their struggle on the public and their opponents, it becomes necessary for them to carefully choose a space or place of struggle. Thus the spatiality or geography of struggle can constitute one of the important components of their movement strategies (see for example Kyan 1966).

Then, *what kind of implications does the spatiality or geography of protest have to the understanding of social movement?* The degree to which SMOs can utilize a particular space such as public space or a particular geography such as urban hierarchy varies according not only to the nature and functional objectives of their movement, but also to the level of political freedom granted by the pertinent local/national government. This means that the use of space or geography for social movement reflects the political structure in which SMOs or activists are situated and that they may use it for their own political purposes and ‘illegally’ against the structure. Therefore an examination of the use of space or geography for social movement would illustrate a spatial or geographical manifestation of the dynamic interaction between political structure and agency.

The subsequent research questions would be *what kind of space or geography is chosen and how it is used as social movement strategy*. According to my previous works (Yamazaki 2004, 2007), there were recognizable tendencies in the location strategies of SMOs. Those tendencies include the choice of the primate city in a region, the transfer of protest activities towards/from cities, and the territoriality of protest. Although these findings cannot be generalized, my works show that the spatiality or geography of social movement is closely connected to the symbolic meanings, functional objectives, and territoriality of the movement. The term “territoriality” used here draws mainly on Robert D. Sack’s theorization (Sack 1986). Sack defines territoriality as an attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. In such a definition, territoriality represents a measure of spatial control exercised by those with power. However, there are examples of territoriality exercised in social movement such as street demonstrations, barricading, sitting-in, or encircling. Location strategies of social movement can thus contain elements of territoriality.

The last research question of this paper concerns *how such location strategies are connected to the more ideational aspects of social movement* or, in other words, *how the causes of social movement affect its location strategies*. In order to answer either question, it becomes necessary to take into account the politics of scale (Smith 1992). As mentioned above, U.S. military presence can be considered a multi-scalar phenomenon with various socio-political effects. U.S. military presence may induce organized protest against it at the local level. Protesters, however, may

make an appeal to the national government and even seek to build global solidarity. Thus the politics of scale constructed by local protesters can also be regarded as a multi-scalar phenomenon. Drawing on the theoretical implications of the politics of scale, this paper examines how the causes of social movement affect its location strategies. Particular attention will be paid to the relationship between the discursively expressed causes, or framing, of social movement and the ‘location’ where a specific collective action related to the movement takes place. By answering these research questions, this paper attempts to clarify the relationship between the postwar global deployment of U.S. military forces, local protest against it, and protesters’ framing of their discontent.

Study site

For this paper, I selected Okinawa as a study site. Okinawa is a Japanese prefecture which consists of more than a hundred islands. U.S. military forces occupied Okinawa near the end of World War II and governed it until 1972. During this period, U.S. military forces confiscated Okinawan private lands and built vast military bases on Okinawa Island (Figure 1). Even after Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972, most of the military bases remained under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Currently, there are more than thirty U.S. military installations and bases located on the Island (Figures 2a and b). The total area of those facilities in Okinawa amounts to more than 70 percent of the total area of those in Japan. Whereas the U.S. government has long regarded Okinawa as a geopolitical “keystone” in Asia, the Japanese government has put importance on U.S. military presence in Okinawa as a deterrence against its potential enemies during and after the Cold War. Japan’s security dependence on the U.S. also stems from its pacifist constitution that prohibits Japan from possessing ‘aggressive’ military forces. As a result, the postwar Japan-U.S. security alliance has continued to impose a security burden (i.e. heavy military presence) on Okinawa.

The concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa has caused various problems such as forcible land seizure, obstacles to effective development, physical and environmental damage, and violent crimes while also providing jobs and rent income for Okinawans who have suffered the innate economic weakness of the island prefecture. In order to compensate for such a burden and stimulate its weak economy, the Japanese government has provided national developmental subsidies for Okinawa, which has made Okinawa dependent on the financial transfer from Japan proper (Yamazaki 2004). The militarization and socio-economic marginalization of Okinawa have also been the major causes of anti-U.S. protest, which has produced unique political dynamics between Okinawa, Japan, and the U.S. and within Okinawa. Therefore, U.S. global strategy, Japan’s security policy, and Okinawa’s local response are all involved in the political dynamics. This is the reason why I chose Okinawa as a study site.

Data and methodology

In order to answer the above-mentioned research questions, three sets of data were collected. First, in order to look at change in the global profile of U.S. troop deployment in the postwar period, the best dataset would be one prepared by Kane (2006). Kane's dataset includes the information about the location and annual amount of U.S. troops by country from 1950 to 2005. Although the data do not show any specific location of the troops within a country, they reveal dynamic changes in the posture of U.S. military forces at the continental level. The spatial pattern of such change can be depicted using GIS.

Second, the collective action dataset constructed for Yamazaki (2004) is used for this paper. They include a variety of information about the attributes of each collective action event (mostly rallies) such as its date, site, subject, organizer, and size. The subject of collective action is further classified into land struggle, reversion movement, anti-U.S. base movement or one of the other categories. The sources of the information are local newspapers in Okinawa (mostly the *Okinawa Taimusu*). These data are quite useful because they can illustrate the spatiality or geography of social movement in Okinawa and its changes in comparison to global U.S. troop deployment revealed by Kane's dataset. Many of the collective actions in Okinawa were organized within the local context. According to the preliminary analysis of the dataset (Yamazaki 2004), protest organizers first utilized urban hierarchy to maximize public support and later became more militant to directly sabotage military exercises near U.S. bases. Apparently, they had some location strategies that were geographically recognizable.

Table 1 summarizes the collective action dataset in a very general way and does not represent the actual pattern of collective action. This is because such tabulation breaks up the 'meaningful' linkages among eight components (year, issue, second issue, organizer, activity scale of organizer, site of protest, place of protest, and size of protest). These linkages are preserved in each event of collective action. It is thus necessary to use a different way of summarizing the collective action dataset without breaking up the inter-component linkages. For this reason, I used a multivariate statistical analysis called Quantification Theory Type 3 (hereafter QT3) formulated by Chikio Hayashi (Hayashi 1950, see also Yamazaki 1997). QT3 is a kind of factor analysis based on qualitative data.

In order to use QT3, the collective action dataset needed to be reconstructed into a 0/1 binary data matrix in which each of the 1,383 cases (called "items" in QT3) had eight 1s in the above-mentioned eight components. Therefore, the characteristics of each collective action event were transformed into (reduced to) the arrangement of eight 1s. The similarity of the characteristics among protest actions (items) is interpreted as that of an arrangement of eight 1s. The meaningful linkages among categories can thus be preserved.

QT3 mathematically rearranges the order of the matrix so that similar items and the related categories can be located as closely as possible in the newly arranged matrix (for illustration, see

Yamazaki 1994). In this process, QT3 gives a numerical value (called “score” in QT3) to each category and a correlation coefficient between rearranged items and categories to the new matrix. By reiterating this process, QT3 shows possible rearrangements of the original matrix with their correlation coefficients. According to the correlation coefficients, statistically significant matrixes can be chosen. Each matrix thus chosen has a newly given score for each category. As mentioned above, the meaningful linkages among categories are converted into the scores, meaning that categories with similar scores can be interpreted as having meaningful linkages to each other. In QT3, such a rearranged matrix constitutes an axis. Each axis contains all the categories with new scores.

Another function of this axis construction is to separate unique categories on an axis since the unique categories are given higher scores (larger absolute values). By constructing a coordinate space with different axes, each category can be located at a particular point in the coordinate space. Therefore, a group of the categories having meaningful linkages (i.e. sharing similarities) appears as a cluster in the coordinate space. Hierarchical cluster analysis can be applied to the axes with statistically significant correlation coefficients in order to group categories according to the distance among them.¹ The groups of categories thus identified represent the factors summarizing the collective action dataset.

Finally, it is necessary to collect information about the ideational aspects of social movement. Political protest usually accompanies statements such as petition, slogans and resolutions, which were also collected for Yamazaki (2004). The textual dataset thus constructed is used for this paper. Protest (mostly rally) statements made public in newspapers as well as the sites of protest represent how protest organizers frame their protest and express its various components such as cause, objective, ideology, strategy, and self-justification. The analysis of such statements is expected to reveal the discursive linkages between global U.S. military presence, the spatiality and geography of political struggle, and protest organizers’ framing of discontent. Particular attention will be paid to how protest organizers accused U.S. military presence in East Asia as well as Okinawa and justified their protest in universal terms. Protest organizers discursively sought to ascribe the causes of their actions to globalized principles such as United Nations’ declarations on human rights and decolonization. Such discursive practices attempt to frame local discontent against global oppression using counter-geopolitical imaginations.

Protest statements in the text dataset contain a variety of information about the formation of collective identity, political consciousness, and world view in political struggle. In order to articulate the role of the spatial or the geographical in the social psychology of protest, I employ frame approach to analyze the text dataset. The frame approach, first formulated by Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986), focuses on the ideational aspect of collective action. By exploring how political discourses to ‘frame’ collective action are constructed, transformed, and extended in the

¹ The Ward method was used for the cluster analysis.

course of social movement, frame analysis attempts to assess the role of ideology, beliefs, and values and examine the interaction among different frames in social movement (e.g. Noonan 1995; Ellingson 1995). Using political statements, slogans, and resolutions expressed mostly by Okinawan protest organizers, I analyze how they frame their political struggle in relation to the geopolitical context of Okinawa.

In order to analyze such textual data, I use NUD*IST Ver. 5 (N5) which is a computer software for coding texts and extracting coded texts. Collected textual data are coded according to their contents and analyzed (grouped or classified) according to the given codes such as “reversion” or “crime.” Therefore, I conduct a qualitative interpretation of protest statements published in the local newspaper by focusing on how protest organizers situate their struggle in the geopolitical context of Okinawa. For each protest statement, I attempt to specify such an aspect and the linkages between U.S. military presence and the framing of discontent. By doing these, I show how important it is for local protesters to construct their protest at multiple scales: to understand the geopolitical location of their locality, utilize the geography of the locality, and justify their protest in counter-geopolitical terms.

Global U.S. troop deployment and Okinawa

In order to understand the global pattern of U.S. military presence, it becomes necessary to put it in time-space contexts. Tim Kane’s report (Kane 2006) shows several interesting facts regarding global U.S. troop deployment from 1950-2005. According to his report, since 1950 fifty-four states have hosted at least 1,000 U.S. troops, and foreign deployments have been concentrated in Europe and Asia (52% in Europe and 41% in Asia), reflecting the U.S. containment policy during the Cold War. More than one-third of troop deployments until 2000 were to Germany that hosted more than 10,000,000 U.S. military personnel. With regard to Asia, Japan and South Korea have hosted approximately 3,942,000 and 3,340,000 personnel respectively, comprising the second and third greatest concentrations in the world. Kane observes that for the most part, U.S. troops were stationed abroad as part of the Cold War system of deterrence through alliances with states such as Japan, South Korea, and NATO member states.

The GIS maps I drew using Kane’s dataset show the spatio-temporal patterns of U.S. military presence (Figure 3). These patterns reflect U.S. foreign policy dealing with global military competitions and related regional conflicts. As mentioned above, the principal pattern of U.S. military presence reflects Cold-War geopolitics such as the containment policy while the end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany. The Vietnam War, the first Gulf War, and the post-9/11 situation add some regional accents to the maps. Kane (2004: 3) points out that the commitment of U.S. troops has been consistent in Europe, varied in Asia, and shallow in the other parts of the world. With regard to Asia, East Asia in particular, the U.S. placed a large amount of

troops in Japan and South Korea in the 1950s and Vietnam in the 1960s, and began to pull them out in the 1970s. However, their presence in Japan and South Korea has been basically maintained until today.

After World War II, Japan was completely disarmed and incorporated into the Western capitalist bloc through U.S. occupation. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements were formally established in 1951 when the Peace Treaty with Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were concluded. The current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty determines two important obligations for both countries. Article 5 of the Treaty requires that the U.S. defend Japan, which implies that an armed attack on Japan would result in a military confrontation with the U.S. and, therefore, means that for Japan the Treaty possesses a deterrent effect. Article 6, conversely, requires Japan to provide the U.S. with areas and facilities so that the U.S. can station its military forces within Japan, particularly in Okinawa. This 'mutual' relationship has sustained Japan's constitutional pacifism and relatively non-aggressive Self Defense Forces (SDF) on one hand, and U.S. forward deployment in East Asia on the other.

As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War necessitated a reexamination of the conventional Japan-U.S. security arrangements which were based on a bipolar world. After a close consultation between Japan and the U.S., the two states announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996. Recognizing that instabilities and uncertainties would continue to exist in the Asia-Pacific region, the two states reconfirmed in the Declaration that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would remain a cornerstone in the maintenance of a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region into the 21st century (Japan Defense Agency 2002: 97).

The Declaration redefined the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as maintaining the existing security arrangements not only for Japan, but also for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The sphere which the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would influence was also correspondingly enlarged from the territory of Japan to the Asia-Pacific region. This indicates that the Japan-U.S. political economic alliance reconstructed the division of labor and cooperation in the region after the Cold War (Grant and Nijman 1997). Thus, the end of the Cold War did not significantly change the nature of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, but the alliance was reinforced against newly-emerging instabilities and uncertainties in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, through the postwar Japan-U.S. security arrangements, Japan's national security has been tightly incorporated into the geopolitical pasture of global U.S. military presence. In this sense, U.S. pasture at the global scale has conditioned/restrained the autonomous shaping of Japan's national security policy while the Japan-U.S. security arrangements have functioned as one of the key regional frameworks for U.S. global military strategy.

Although the remaining of U.S. military forces within Japan is a result of the historical process of U.S. occupation and the subsequent Japan-U.S. relations, it has had its own geography

and scale. As Figure 4 shows, after the War the allied (mainly U.S.) military forces took over Japanese military bases. Until the occupation came to an end in 1951, most of the U.S. bases in Japan were located in Japan proper. As Japan restored its full sovereignty in 1952, U.S. bases in Japan proper drastically decreased in number while those in Okinawa increased under continuing U.S. occupation. 20 years after Japan's re-independence, Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972. However, as Figure 4 shows, the reallocation of U.S. bases to Okinawa was completed upon reversion, meaning that Okinawa was reconfigured as a host site for U.S. bases (in favor of Japan proper) under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. This spatially uneven distribution of U.S. bases has had two implications. One is that it has functioned as a spatial concealment of 'territorial injustice' so that most Japanese in Japan proper have enjoyed 'peace' without physically, though not financially, carrying the security burden of hosting U.S. military presence. The other is that Okinawa has had to suffer from the damage caused by the over-concentration of U.S. bases that currently occupy 20% of the area of Okinawa Island.

In short, U.S. military presence has produced two different geographies within Japan. Nationally, it has constituted a kind of 'invisible shield' for Japan's territory. For Japanese in Japan proper, the existence of U.S. military forces has been virtually a matter of discourse or imaginary. It is possible to discuss but almost impossible to see, hear, or sense it. On the other hand, U.S. military forces have been omnipresent on Okinawa Island. For many Okinawans on the Island, their presence has been undeniably visible and part of their daily life. It can be said from this that U.S. military forces within Japan have been physically (almost) absent but functionally present at the national scale while physically present and functionally over-present in a particular locality. For Okinawa, the meanings of the scale of U.S. military presence are twofold. While Okinawa has been imprinted onto the global geopolitical map of U.S. foreign policy, it has been an 'important' but marginalized locality for Japan's national security policy under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

The historical contexts of local protest

As mentioned above, the militarization and marginalization of Okinawa have caused Okinawans discontents and led to continuous protests against U.S. military presence and Japan's security policy. Using local newspapers (mainly the *Okinawa Taimusu*) I collected collective action events (mostly rallies) from 1949-2000. Figure 5 shows that there were four peaks of collective action, and each peak represents a different context of social movement with different causes and SMOs; the land struggle in the 1950s, the reversion movement in the 1960s, the anti-U.S. base movement in the 1980s, and the political uprising over Okinawa's status in the 1990s. As shown below, each period is also characterized by different sets of components of social movement.

However, there are some common traits across the peaks. Before reversion, the major cause of protest can be summarized as getting rid of a foreign rule. Pre-reversion protests tend to be

nationalistic and aim at national/territorial reunification despite the fact that native Okinawans are a distinct ethnic group in Japan (Yamazaki 2003). After reversion, protest was weakened due to the realization of the pre-reversion desire. The oppression imposed on Okinawa was redefined and drove anti-U.S. base (anti-nuclear/war) movements accusing the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Compared to the pre-reversion social movement, the post-reversion one tended to be weak and fragmented due to a decrease in participants and the ideological split between social democrats and communists. The increase in the number of collective action events in the 1980s was mostly nominal because faction-torn SMOs staged their own rallies at the same site on the same day. This political split was brought into Okinawa through reversion as a result of the reorganization of Okinawa's political parties and labor unions along the lines of political cleavages in Japan proper (Yamazaki 2006).

Local protest in Okinawa has also produced its own geography. It is possible to trace the spatial patterns of protest using information about where and how protests were organized (Yamazaki 2004). I attempt to empirically examine the spatial manifestation of collective action by mapping where such an event took place (Figure 6). Among the noticeable aspects of the production of geography by protest organizers are the 'centralization' and 'localization' of protest. The pre-reversion location strategy was characterized by centralization. Protest organizers during the 1960s staged rallies at major cities on Okinawa Island such as Naha and Koza (currently Okinawa) Cities. Their objectives were relatively 'abstract' such as opposing a foreign military rule and demanding reversion. The centralization of protest was partially ascribed to the fact that a prefecture-wide, umbrella organization called *Fukkikyō* lead the reversion movement.

To the contrary, post-reversion protest organizers were more often local agents such as municipalities and residents (see Figure 5) in addition to the fact that prefecture-wide SMOs were politically split. This also means that the targets of protest were shifted from non-material, abstract, and institutional arrangements to U.S. bases as physical manifestations of such problematic arrangements and that direct damages from the bases such as accident, noise, environmental deterioration, and crime became the major causes of collective action by the locals. Rallies tended to be staged around the bases and exhibited a clear pattern of localization with the number of participants significantly declining in each event.

Before reversion, mobilization by protest organizers was more successful and affected the Japan-U.S. security arrangements (for this political process, see Yamazaki 2003). After reversion, the geography of protest has appeared spatially disperse but been far more locally fragmented so that its influence on political processes at the national or international level seems to have been limited. One of the biggest reasons for this is that a significant portion of protesters in the reversion movement did not remain in the post-reversion anti-base movement. And the post-reversion national subsidies poured into Okinawa contributed to the conservatization of Okinawans (Yamazaki 2004, 2006). This

tendency basically continued into the 1990s.

The above-mentioned general understanding of the political structure and processes in which Okinawa has been situated makes it possible to further examine the spatio-temporal development of collective action events. In the following chapter, I will look more closely at the geography of protest in each historical period. For convenience, the period from 1949-2000 is divided into the following four periods each of which reflects an important epoch for the political history of Okinawa: 1949-1959, 1960-1974, 1975-1990, and 1991-2000.

The geography of protest

1949-1959

For the rallies organized in the 1950s, the results of QT3 analysis and the subsequent cluster analyses show several notable factors of collective action (Table 2). With regard to the issue of protest, Cluster A represents two of the typical subjects of collective action during the decade: anti-war, peace movement (Sub-cluster A1) and land struggle (A2). Cluster B concerns the early reversion movement taking place over the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951. Cluster E includes Sub-cluster E1 that is related to protest against accidents or crimes caused by U.S. military personnel while Cluster F illustrates students' protest against regulation on land struggle. Compared to the other periods mentioned below, collective action during this period is characterized by the issues of protest represented by these Clusters.

In terms of the site of protest, Clusters A (Sub-cluster A1) includes the prefecture capital (i.e. old Naha City, for its location see Figure 2b), and Cluster E (Sub-cluster E1) contains collective action in local cities or towns. During this period, there were 55 collected events, 25 (45.5%) of which were staged in the prefecture capital. Although these 25 events evenly covered the above-mentioned three movements, 20 were organized by prefecture-wide SMOs. In the case of land struggle, the early stage of this movement began in the early 1950s in several rural settlements, such as the Isahama district in Ginowan Village and the Maja district in Ie Village, which were suffering from forcible land seizures by U.S. military forces.

According to the *Okinawa Taimusu*, in 1954 a number of residents from Isahama came to the Office of the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) in Naha City to file a claim for the solution of forcible land seizure (*Okinawa Taimusu* 10/21/1954 evening edition: 2). In 1955 representatives of Maja District began a hunger strike to protest the seizure in front of the GRI Office (*Okinawa Taimusu* 3/15/1955 evening edition: 2). Initially localized movements such as these soon developed into a collective action on the urban stage when reportedly more than 2000 Okinawan landowners got together in Naha City to oppose forcible land seizures (*Okinawa Taimusu* 4/14/1955: 2). As Yamazaki (2003) shows, this land struggle went beyond the movement of landowners to include ordinary citizens and mobilize their nationalistic sentiment as Japanese against the U.S. military

administration. Rallies during the land struggle in 1956 were staged all over Okinawa, but large-scale ones with more than 50,000 participants were organized in Naha and Koza (currently Okinawa) Cities. The latter was the second largest city in Okinawa.

For the anti-war, peace movement, six out of eight rallies in this category were held in Naha City and one in Koza City while for the early reversion movement, five out of eight rallies in this category were staged in Naha City. In addition, 19 (34.6%) out of 55 collective action events took place in cities or towns other than Naha City. More than half of them (11 events) were categorized into land struggle. Because I categorized rallies staged in places where forcible land seizures were carried out as 'on-site' protest, it can be said that these urban rallies were oriented towards cities as stages of off-site protest.

Moreover, four rallies categorized as protest against crimes conducted by U.S. military personnel were staged during this period. Three of them were related to the incidents where two Okinawan girls were raped and one of them was murdered by U.S. servicemen in September 1955. According to the *Okinawa Times*, the first rally was held in September 1955 by a local SMO in Ishikawa City where the murdered girl lived. Immediately after that, rallies were organized by local SMOs in other municipalities such as Gushikawa Village where the other girl was raped. In the following month, prefecture-wide SMOs organized the rally in Naha that attracted approximately 5,000 participants. As seen in the case of land struggle, rallies against crimes by U.S. military personnel were also oriented towards the prefecture capital as they grew prefecture-wide.

How did protest organizers or local protesters frame their protest? Let us take a look at their statements published in the *Okinawa Taimusu*. In the early stage of the land struggle, representatives of the Maja district in Ie Village wrote a letter of petition to the Chief Executive of the GRI in February 1955. Part of it said:

Now the district residents have turned a petition with tears into a desperate battle. The first thing we would like persons of good sense to know is what and how much the land the military forces are about to confiscate is producing. The reliable survey conducted by the industrial section of the Village Government shows the following: the (annual) agricultural income is 3,849,500 yen; the stockbreeding income 296,400 yen; the non-agricultural income 86,400 yen; the forestry income 5,480,000 yen; and the total amount of the incomes is 10,712,300 yen. Compared to this, the amount of the fees paid by the forces is only 180, 288 yen (however, the fees have not been paid since last year) which cannot be considered the fair amount of compensation. That we, farmers, have our lands confiscated for military uses means that we have our bodies cut off piece by piece. (*Okinawa Taimusu* 2/3/1954: 2)

More than a year later, the speeches and resolutions of the rally organized by various organizations in Naha City stated (*Ryukyu Shimpo* 7/29/1956 in Nakano 1969: 201-202):

The Price Report² has exposed America's real intentions. America, which had tortured Okinawans for ten years, started saying that they [it] would seize new land. They [it] sprinkled gasoline from the sky and burned the crops in Ie Island during Okinawans' struggle against the Price Report. Atrocious! Human beings could not do this. Although they say [it says] that land is necessary for world peace, the world is peaceful now. It is they Americans who attempt to construct bases by seizing Okinawans' land, to initiate war, and to destroy world peace. Their intention is to construct peace at the expense of the different national group.

(A representative of the Okinawan university students studying in Japan proper)

How would the spirits of the three [sic] great Americans such as Lincoln and Jefferson view the American governance over Okinawa for the past ten years? How would they feel if they saw America treat 800,000 Okinawans cruelly in order to prevent communism? To realize the Four Principles³ is the minimum hope for Okinawans to live with.

(Koichi Taira, Chairman of the Okinawa Social Mass Party)

America sprinkled gasoline from the sky and burned the crops in the Maja district of Ie Island which has been struggling for two years. A liter of water, a grain of sand, or a piece of land is not for America. [...] We should initiate disobedience movements against America.

(Kamejiro Senaga, Chairman of the Okinawa People's Party)

We have accumulated bloody and tearful tragedies under a great amount of severe sacrifice and coercion for eleven years after the war and have stood up decisively with our 80,000,000 national compatriots for the defense of our territory and the protection of the right to live. [...] We defend the Four Principles desperately to defend our national homeland and nation and protect the land and life of all the Okinawans. [...] We resist like iron with our determination not to sell any single piece of national land to America and with our undefeatable unity and solidarity.

² This report recommended that U.S. military forces in Okinawa establish semi-permanent lease hold on Okinawan private lands for their military use.

³ The following four principles became the major frame in the 1956 land struggle: 1) abolition of lump-sum payments, 2) appropriate compensation for land seizure, 3) appropriate reparation for the damage caused by U.S. military forces, and 4) opposition to any new land seizure.

(Part of the Declaration of the rally)

By comparing those framings between the early and final stages of the land struggle, one thing becomes clear; as the land struggle developed from localized protest into a more nationalistic movement, protest organizers targeted more abstracted geopolitics of the U.S. administration over Okinawa. This means that the centralization of collective action reflects protest organizers' redefinition and scaling-up of the movement and abstraction of its causes with more universal rather than local terms.

However, this is not always the case. The case of sexual assaults by U.S. servicemen took a slightly different path in the development of protest. While it took more than a year for the localized land struggle beginning in rural settlements to develop into a nationalistic, anti-U.S. movement, protest against such assaults quickly spread in the Central Region of Okinawa Island. There were two assaults against Okinawan girls in a row in September 1955, which stirred up Okinawan grievances against the U.S. military. In addition, these incidents took place when the land struggle was becoming a prefecture-wide, 'national' problem. Under this condition, a network of SMOs such as women, youth, and teachers associations had been ready for a prefecture-wide protest against the crimes. At the beginning of a series of rallies against them, the statement of the rally in Ishikawa City listed the following requests (*Okinawa Taimusu* 9/17/1955: 3):

- i. Incidents such as these should be settled with death penalty regardless of race and nationality.
- ii. Abolish extritoriality and settle the incidents related to off-base U.S. personnel in the civil court.
- iii. Allow Okinawan law officers to attend the trial and broadcast its audiotape to the whole public.
- iv. If the U.S. truly has the tradition of justice, humanity, and democracy, enforce military discipline and perform the original duty to promote Okinawans' welfare.
- v. It is thought that incidents such as these and other various crimes are based on the political, economic, and social psychological instability stemming from the status in which Ryukyu⁴ is situated. Therefore, politicians should swiftly shape policies to stabilize politics, economy, and social psychology and take measures not to disorganize the public.

Unlike the petition filed by people from the Maja district, these requests refer to universal

⁴ *Ryukyu* is the former Chinese name of Okinawa before it was annexed to Japan in the late 19th century. Unlike the Japanese government, the U.S. military administration called Okinawa by the former name intentionally.

causes such as justice, humanity, and democracy and the geopolitical location of Okinawa. A month later (October 1955), nineteen prefecture-wide SMOs organized a rally to appeal to the U.S. administration to protect Okinawan human rights. The declaration of the rally argued that even though the world was becoming peaceful after World War II and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan, Okinawa has been placed in an unusual status and that as a result, the life of Okinawans has been forced into a materially and psychologically unstable situation. As examples of such a situation it referred to repeated sexual assaults against Okinawan women, forcible land seizures of Okinawan private land, and the racially discriminative treatments and inadequate conditions of Okinawan workers. The resolution adopted in the rally included the following items (*Okinawa Taimusu* 10/23/1955):

- i. The seeds of fear exist in our society. We request [the U.S. administration] to emancipate us from this fear.
- ii. We attempt to establish a human rights association to protect all of our basic human rights.
- iii. We request to ban racially discriminative wages and attempt to cast aside racially discriminative sentiments.
- iv. We attempt to help Okinawan labor unions acquire their rights and request to emancipate from the fear of layoff and unemployment.
- v. We protect the Four Principles for the military land problem.
- vi. With regard to the crimes by foreigners against Okinawans, we request to make trials and their results public.
- vii. Abolishment of exterritoriality and transference of the crimes committed by foreigners to the civil court.
- viii. Appropriate compensation for crimes by foreigners and all other problems.

These two rallies referred to the violation of Okinawan human rights by U.S. military personnel. And the organizers of both rallies suggested that the geopolitical location of Okinawa under U.S. military strategy brought about many problems life-threatening to Okinawans. The rally in October 1955 was staged in Naha City and reportedly attracted about 5,000 participants. It enlarged the target of the rally by including other issues related to the violation of Okinawan human rights. Although the rally in September only suggested that the U.S. should have adhered to universal values such as justice, humanity, and democracy, the rally in October ascribed the source of problems facing Okinawans to the serious violation of their human rights by the U.S. military.

As shown above, the spatial development of these rallies, or their orientation towards the prefecture capital, is in parallel with the framing-up or scaling-up of the cause of protest in more

abstract and universal terms. For both cases mentioned above, the initial protest occurred in/near the place where direct damage was done on Okinawan lives. The cause of protest expressed there was more concrete and specific than that in the later rallies staged in Naha City. Thus it can be said hypothetically that the spatial centralization of protest towards a capital city accompanies the abstraction, universalization, and scaling-up of the cause of protest.

1960-1974

According to the results of cluster analysis (Table 3), collective action from 1960-1974 consists of a variety of elements. Before 1972, the reversion movement (Sub-cluster B3) became very active and radicalized, leading to more militant protests against U.S. military presence. In terms of the geography of protest, collective action during this period was roughly differentiated into three groups: on-site protests (Cluster A), protests in local cities (Cluster E), and protests in the prefecture capital (Cluster C). Protest organizers were differentiated accordingly; Cluster A includes residents and municipalities while Cluster E contains prefecture-wide organizations that were able to attract many participants. The more localized protests became, the smaller the jurisdictions (i.e. activity scales) of their organizers. Compared to the other periods, collective action in this period is characterized by a drastic increase in on-site protest. 143 (31.2%) out of 492 events fall into this category while 7.2% in the previous period. However, rallies organized in Naha City as the prefecture capital are still many (108 events, 23.6%) in addition to a newly emerging type of rally staged in front of the Office of the GRI or the Okinawa Prefecture Government (83 events, 18.1%). This illustrates that the centralization of protest was still dominant.

After the establishment of *Fukkikyo* (Okinawa ken sokoku fukki kyogikai, Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council) in 1960, the reversion movement was led and strengthened by this organization. Although *Fukkikyo* organized this prefecture-wide movement, the conservative party and organizations did not join it, which partially contributed to the left-leaning and radicalization of *Fukkikyo* after 1965. As a result, the reversion movement in the 1960s tended to blame not only the U.S. but also the conservative Japanese government for not negotiating with the U.S. about the reduction of U.S. bases within Okinawa and not revising the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. With regard to the location strategy of the reversion movement, there was no on-site protest classified into this movement since the movement was not necessarily place-specific. But it had distinct characteristics in its location strategy. The most typical is to stage rallies in Naha City as the prefecture capital (37 events, 38.6%) as well as those in front of the GRI or Okinawa Prefecture Office in Naha City (13 events, 13.5%). What follows this is to organize reversion rallies in local cities (31 events, 32.3%).

Following the previous period, protest organizers in this period continued to utilize the

political centrality of the prefecture capital and urban hierarchy.⁵ The selection of the prefecture capital as a site of protest indicates that the appeals of protesters were directed towards the entire prefecture and/or the outside of the prefecture. For instance, the rally for reversion that reportedly attracted about 170,000 participants declared:

The humiliating day of April 28th has come this year as usual. The duration of the unjust military colonial rule by the U.S., which separated Okinawa from its homeland, is approaching the 25th year. During the period, constructing our solidarity with the compatriots in the mainland, we requested the prompt, unconditional, and complete return of Okinawa and continued the struggle to refuse the unjust divide-and-rule policy for military purposes.

This struggle for an emancipation of Okinawa has been supported by broad strata of the nation that seek for peace and democracy, and it made remarkable progress. On the other hand, the Japanese and U.S. governments did not change their intention concerning the divide-and-rule policy toward Okinawa in order to maintain the military arrangements in Asia. Moreover, as seen in the stationing of B52 bombers and the free call of atomic submarines, bases in Okinawa are being further strengthened as nuclear bases and departure bases for the aggressive Vietnam War, which causes unspeakable uneasiness in the people of the prefecture.

Before the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1970, the Okinawa Problem becomes a focus of debates. The Sato Cabinet, which intends the rearmament of Japan and the revival of militarism, skillfully manipulates the national public opinions over the reversion of Okinawa and attempts the free use of bases and the reversion with nuclear [weapons].

We ought to resolutely break the intentions to impose such severe conditions on Okinawa in order to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and to arm Japan with nuclear [weapons].

Upon opening this rally now, we swear and declare that we will further strengthen our unity and solidarity and that we will continue to struggle with concerted efforts in order to win “the prompt, unconditional, and complete reversion of Okinawa” based on our solidarity with the entire nation of the mainland. (The rally organized by *Fukkikyo* in Naha City, *Okinawa Taimusu* 4/29/1969: 2)

As shown in this statement, Naha City was a place to make an appeal directed towards the people of

⁵ By “urban hierarchy” I mean the following; since each Region in Okinawa has its central city, it became a stage of localized protest as opposed to Naha City as the stage of prefecture-wide protest.

the prefecture, the Japanese public, the Japanese and U.S. governments, and the international society, particularly in Asia.

On the other hand, *Fukkikyo* organized symbolic rallies at Cape Hedo in the northern fringe of Okinawa Island before 1972 (13 events, 13.5%) in order to ‘visualize’ the boundary separating Okinawa from Japan proper. Such a localization of protest was another aspect of the location strategy of the reversion movement which attempted to create the prefecture-wide scale of protest (Kyan 1966; Yamazaki 2007).

As the composition of Sub-cluster A1 shows, many protests are related to anti-base movement whose location strategy is typically to organize demonstrations near U.S. military bases. Municipalities such as Kadena, Chatan, Yomitan, and Kin Villages are included in this cluster because they had a significant portion of their land occupied by military bases. Protest organizers staged rallies in these villages. Out of 143 on-site protests, 51 (35.7%) were organized by prefecture-wide organizations, meaning that they were not necessarily locally based. This shift in location strategy towards localization was closely related to that in the targets and ideology of Okinawan protest (Yamazaki 2004).

To the contrary, on-site protests organized by residents (25 events, 17.5%) can be considered a direct expression of protesters’ grievances against U.S. bases in their neighborhoods. There were 13 rally statements issued by municipalities and/or residents’ organizations. Nine of them referred exclusively to damages to residents’ daily lives. For example:

The murder case caused by the car [driven by a U.S. serviceman] came as a tremendous surprise to the residents. [...] Similar cases that took place several times in the past were dealt with insufficiently without satisfying the residents and made it impossible for them to live safely. (The resolution adopted by the local PTA and other 24 organizations in the rally protesting the hit-and-run case by a U.S. officer, Koza City, *Okinawa Taimusu* 9/29/1961: 7)

As a minimum condition in which the village people can live as human beings, we have kept requesting that U.S. military authorities immediately stop [the emission of] sand dust. Nevertheless, U.S. military forces disregarded the residents’ serious request, still scatter deadly ash around, and continue inhumane acts. (The declaration of the hunger strike by the Kadena Village Assembly, Kadena Village, *Okinawa Taimusu* 6/24/1966 evening edition: 3)

We, the residents facing the planned route for the transportation [of the poison gas], were united and stood up to request security measures. However, we are not satisfied with the

explanation of the U.S. military authorities, which does not at all dispel uneasiness and puts us into the crossroad between life and death. From our desperate position to protect our own life, we strongly oppose U.S. military forces' unilateral decision on the transportation route. (The resolution concerning the removal of poison gas by the U.S. military forces adopted in the residents' rally of Kitami Elementary and Misato Junior High School Districts, Misato Village (currently Okinawa City), *Okinawa Taimusu* 1/8/1971: 9)

These statements clearly illustrate that the geographical proximity to U.S. bases gave the neighboring residents and municipalities very concrete agendas to tackle on a daily basis. After the land struggle in the 1950s, collective actions against various damages to their daily lives gradually came to the fore in the 1960s and 70s, which is reflected in an increase in collective action organized by residents (Figure 5).

With regard to the nature of collective action, the formation of six clusters with several sub-clusters illustrates that collective action in this period consisted of various issues and took place in various places. U.S. bases and military exercises became direct targets of Okinawan protest in this period. Such a type of collective action was rarely seen from 1949-1959. Compared to the other periods, base employment, the popular election of the Chief Executive of the GRI, and the reversion to Japan became major issues of protest. These changes in the nature of collective action indicate that the U.S. military administration over Okinawa was reaching an impasse.

In sum, the issues of protest at that time concerned the political status of Okinawa in a broader (prefecture, national, or international) context. This seems to have contributed to the centralization of protest towards the prefecture capital and other cities although a tendency of localization also appeared in on-site protest against U.S. bases that had a direct impact on Okinawan daily life.

1975-1990

Collective action in this period is characterized by an increase in on-site protest against U.S. military bases. Out of 565 events, 391 (69.2%) were categorized into anti-base protests, 325 of which were on-site actions. According to the cluster analysis on this period (Table 4), Cluster A contains two Sub-clusters (A1 and A2) consisting of 19 categories. Cluster A1 indicates that anti-base, peace movements took place around the Kadena Air Base⁶ from 1980-1990, that those movements attracted a relatively small number of participants (100-999), and that labor unions

⁶ The base is the functionally largest U.S. airbase in the Far East (19,959,000m²) spreading over Chatan Town, Kadena Town, and Okinawa City.

active at the sub-prefecture scale⁷ often organized rallies. Thus, Cluster A1 represents localized on-site protest in the Central Region of Okinawa Island from 1980-1990. Cluster A2, on the other hand, shows that anti-nuclear/peace organizations active at the prefecture scale organized rallies targeting the Naha Defense Bureau and military practices and bases in Kin Village, the Kisenbaru area,⁸ and Katsuren Town. Cluster A2 also indicates that the size of these rallies tended to be small (fewer than 100 participants). In sum, Cluster A shows that localized on-site protest organized by non-resident organizations took place in the Central Region and attracted a smaller number of participants. Since Cluster A contains three categories by year (1980-84, 1985-89, and 1990-94⁹), most of the rallies taking place in those years are represented by Cluster A.

Cluster B has two Sub-clusters (B1 and B2). Cluster B1 represents protest actions in Yomitan Village, Ginowan City, Nago City, and Kunigami Village (79 events, 14.0 %). These municipalities organized protest actions against military exercises and practices held in their jurisdictions. Therefore, 'Municipality' and SMOs active at the 'Municipal' scale are included in this cluster. Statistically 'ACCIDENT' (accidents or crimes caused by U.S. military forces) has a close relationship with none of those specific municipalities but with 'Municipality,' suggesting that municipalities in general tend to react to direct damages caused by U.S. bases. It can be said that municipalities in Okinawa have constituted important agents for protest. Cluster B2 represents localized protest organized by residents (57 events, 10.1%). Sub-municipal districts called *ku* organized protest actions in Ginoza and Onna Villages. These actions were also against military exercises and practices. Unlike Cluster A, Cluster B includes municipalities in the North Region such as Nago City and Kunigami Village and represents locally based on-site protest against U.S. bases. The agents for protest in Cluster B are different from those in Cluster A. They are municipalities and/or residents, suggesting that their motives for protest were not so ideological.

In order to understand such differences in motives for protest by organizer, it would be useful to compare two rallies against the same issue in the same place by different organizers. In 1988, *Kenrokyo* (*Okinawaken rodo kumiai kyogikai*, Okinawa Prefecture Council of Labor Unions) and other SMOs organized a rally with 4,500 participants in Kin Village. The resolution of the rally stated:

Intensified military practices will not only worsen international tensions but also increase military expenses, destroy human mind, and lead human beings to the path of destruction. We oppose to all the military exercises and the strengthening of bases that violate human rights and threaten [human] life and property and strongly request the complete removal of

⁷ In this case, the labor union in the central region (*Chubu chiku-ro*), which was a member of *Kenrokyo*, organized or co-organized many protest actions.

⁸ The Kisenbaru area is a place located across Onna and Kin Villages.

⁹ Only items (events) taking place in 1990, not those in other years, are included in the analysis.

military bases. (*Okinawa Taimusu* 9/15/1988: 2)

On the other hand, residents in the Onna district held a rally against the same military practices with 400 participants. The resolution of the rally stated:

A new practice site for live-shell shooting is being constructed in the Onna exercise field of Camp Hansen. This makes residents in the Onna district feel tremendous fear and shock. The site is only a few hundred meters away from the residential area [...] There are a catchment area and dams for agricultural irrigation [in the site]. [The practice] will not only make it difficult to control the catchment area and dams but also necessitate the destruction of water containing forests, the pollution of water, and the drain of the catchment area. Therefore, [we] can never allow the enlargement of the facilities for live-shell shooting practice that will threaten the security of the lives and properties of the district residents. (*Okinawa Taimusu* 12/19/1988: 1)

Despite referring to the same practices in the same place and year, these two statements have completely different scopes of and reasonings for protest; the statement by local residents was firmly based on their daily life.

In contrast to Clusters A and B, Cluster D indicates the political centrality of Naha City as the prefecture capital (95 events, 16.8%). Protest actions against U.S. bases, the continuing forcible use of private land for U.S. bases, activities of the SDF in Okinawa, and the visit of the Emperor's family took place in Naha City. SMOs related to these actions include the joint councils and land-related councils that were prefecture-wide, umbrella organizations binding various SMOs.¹⁰ The above-mentioned issues were not necessarily place-specific or localized but able to be shared among many Okinawans in the prefecture. As examined in the previous sections, the concentration of such protest actions in the prefecture capital implies that a scale where a particular issue occurs can influence protester's choice of the site of protest. Such a choice is a location strategy to increase public awareness and impacts on the national and local governments. In the 1950s, Okinawan protesters utilized the political centrality of Naha City from the beginning of their protests. However,

¹⁰ Leftist joint struggle councils (*kyoto kaigi*) were often formed for elections and lawsuits in Okinawa. With regard to Cluster D, the Prefecture People's Joint Struggle Council (*Kenmin kyoto kaigi*) was formed to support the lawsuits over the unconstitutionality of military land use in Okinawa in the late 1980s. The Council consisted of sixteen organizations. A council with the same name organized lawsuits and movements in the late 1990s. According to the record of the lawsuits (*Okinawa gun'yochi ikensosho shien kenmin kyoto kaigi* 1998), the council consisted of peace movement organizations, labor unions, retired teachers' associations, a reformist mayors' association, reformist parties, and an anti-war landowners' association. This council included both social democrat and communist parties as well as their related organizations. Thus "joint struggle (*kyoto*)" meant the cooperation between social democrats and communists.

Naha City was not so much preferred in this period. This further explains that protest actions during this period tended to be localized and segmented as already shown. The factor representing localized on-site protest clearly appears in the analysis for the periods from 1960-1974 and from 1975-1990. The localization of protest indicates that direct action against the source of oppression became a popular repertoire. It seems that the reversion in 1972 caused splits among Okinawan protesters over the form of reversion, and the disappearance of an overriding frame for solidarity (i.e. reversion as national reunification) deepened the splits (Yamazaki 2007).

In face of the continuing U.S. military presence and the strengthening of the function of U.S. bases, how to make Okinawa a core of anti-war, peace movements became important for (especially leftist) SMOs after the reversion. Instead of *Fukkikyo*, faction-torn *Gensuikyo* (*Gensuibaku kinshi okinawa ken kyogikai*, the Okinawa Prefecture Council against Atomic & Hydrogen Bombs) and other anti-war SMOs came to the fore. The frames resituating Okinawa in Asia, not within Japan, became dominant as shown below.

By closely connecting the aggressive U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty with the Japan-South Korea Treaty by way of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the true aims [of the recent talks between Japan's Prime Minister Miki and U.S. President Ford and between U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Japan's Secretary of Defense Agency Sakata] were to fully mobilize Japan's aggressive camps for the strategy of American imperialism in Korea and to make use of Japan as a military base. [This] means that, according to the American imperialistic "New Strategy in Asia," the spear of the reactionary conspiracy between Japan and the U.S. and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has been directed toward all the peace-loving people in Asia. Now, bases in Okinawa became a pivotal point (kaname) in the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In addition, the nuclear armament of Japan and the reorganization and strengthening of bases by Japanese and U.S. imperialisms are under way. Military maneuvers and damages from bases, and brutal crimes by military personnel are increasing in number. On the other hand, as seen in the dismissal of a number of base employees, at the expense of base employees the concentration and development of bases and the strengthening and perpetuation of the SDF military functions are being attempted, and the moves for the Japan-U.S. joint [military] training became active. (The resolution of the rally protesting the Japan-U.S. talks on their security arrangements held by the SDPJ-affiliated *Gensuikyo* in Naha City with 2000 participants, *Okinawa Taimusu* 8/28/1975: 2)

As shown in this passage, for *Gensuikyo*, Okinawa was being firmly integrated into the trilateral security relations between Japan, the U.S., and South Korea. *Gensuikyo* argued that in such

a situation Okinawa would be used by these states for their aggression toward Asia. Describing Okinawa as “a pivotal point in the Japan-U.S. security arrangements” clearly represents that the location of Okinawa was interpreted from a geopolitical point of view. A similar view was repeatedly expressed in other rallies.

As seen in the reorganization and strengthening of the combat troops for nuclear strategy in the Kadena Air Base, bases in Okinawa are being strengthened and [Okinawa is] transformed from *a keystone to a cornerstone in Asia*. In addition, as represented in the communication base under construction in Gushikawa City, the Japanese and U.S. governments returned part of the land used for U.S. bases [to Japan], are transferring it to the SDF, are taking advantage of the difficulty to identify land registers in Okinawa, and clearly show that the SDF are complementary troops [to the U.S. forces]. (The appeal of the rally held by the Okinawa Prefecture Peace Committee¹¹ in Naha City with 200 participants, *Okinawa Taimusu* 10/22/75: 2, emphasis added)

Since its defeat in the aggressive Indochina War, American imperialism put forward the policies of oppression and aggression in Asia. In particular, it situates Okinawa as “a keystone” for its military strategies in the Far East, reorganizes the military bases, and further enhances their functions. In this background the recent arrival of B52 [bombers] was an attempt to strengthen the offensive nuclear power based on the bases in Okinawa and to freely utilize the bases. [We] must never allow these [attempts]. (The resolution of the rally held by the SDPJ-affiliated *Gensuikyo* in Kadena Town with 4,500 participants, *Okinawa Taimusu* 5/22/1976: 1)

Although Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972, it is still in the situation called “Okinawa in bases.” The existence of military bases becomes a source of evil threatening to the lives, livelihoods, nature, culture, and educational environment of the people of the prefecture. Essentially, the function of the U.S. bases is to play a role as a core of nuclear communication network and offensive bases in the sea area and airspace, which connect to the Pacific Ocean [where] Hawaii, Guam, and South Korea [are located] and to South East Asia. Therefore, bases in Okinawa become the biggest obstacle to world peace, particularly to peace in Asia, and the establishment of non-nuclear-armament areas. They must be removed immediately. (The appeal of the human chain action organized by Okinawa Prefecture Action Committee and seven other regional Action Committees in

¹¹ The Okinawa Prefecture Peace Committee (*Okinawa ken heiwa iinkai*) has been affiliated with the Japan Communist Party.

Kadena Town with 2,500 participants, *Okinawa Taimusu* 6/22/1987: 3)

Such a geopolitical perception as situating Okinawa in the Asia-Pacific region has appeared in rallies since the 1950s. The term “keystone of the Pacific” was first used by the U.S. military government to express Okinawa’s geopolitical ‘advantage’ and justify U.S. military presence in Okinawa (Yoshida 2001: 61). As shown above, a similar framing of Okinawa was repeatedly used by Okinawan protesters to criticize such a justification. In this process, Okinawa began to be situated not only in relation to Japan but also within the Asia-Pacific region after the reversion.

During the period from 1975-1990, the only rally that was organized by residents and had its resolution published in the *Okinawa Taimusu* took place. The rally was staged in one of the districts of Onna Village to oppose the construction of a new training facility in Camp Hansen in fear of the occurrence of further accidents and the deterioration of water sources. As examined in the previous sections, the framing of discontent by the village people is significantly different from those by SMOs shown above in that the village people referred only to possible direct damages of a new training site to their daily life.

A new live-weapons training site is being constructed within the exercise range of Camp Hansen near the Onna District. This gives the people of the Onna district great concern and shock. The site is only several hundred meters away from the residential district [...] It will be inevitable not only that it will be difficult to maintain these water sources and dams, but also that the site will destroy recharge forests and bring about water pollution and the drain of the sources. Therefore, we can never allow the addition of a live-weapons training facility that would threaten the security of the lives and properties of the District people. (The resolution of protest by the Onna district in Onna Village, *Okinawa Taimusu* 12/19/1988: 1)

Therefore, the localization of protest during this period indicates that it was a location strategy employed by particularly party-affiliated SMOs to directly demonstrate their discontents against U.S. bases in front of them. This also partially reflects their disappointment at the conservative prefecture and national governments as tough negotiators against the U.S. (Yamazaki 2007) Accordingly the framings of discontent represented and problematized the geopolitical location of Okinawa under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements regardless of the place of protest. While the political centrality of Naha City as the prefecture capital was relatively declining in collective action, local protest such as the one in Onna Village continued to express the direct damages of U.S. military presence to the daily life of the locals.

1991-2000

The results of cluster analysis (Table 5) show that protest actions from 1991-2000 have the following features. First, on-site protest actions against military bases and exercises (Cluster A) are fairly common (150 events) and 54% of them (81 events) are led by anti-nuclear/war organizations, labor unions, or both. On-site protest actions led by local residents or municipalities (Cluster B) were fewer (37 events). Party-affiliated SMOs such as anti-nuclear/war organizations and labor unions¹² were more politically active than local residents or municipalities towards the problems caused by U.S. bases. In other words, many of these actions may not have been firmly rooted in localities. The case of Yomitan Village, however, may be the only exception.¹³ For both types of protest actions, the size of participants was very small (mostly fewer than 100). While the localization and fragmentation of protest actions continued, they did not necessarily attract a large number of participants.

Second, there were various kinds of protest actions within Okinawa Island in the 1990s. Predominant places of protest include Naha City (89 events), Kin Village (32), Nago City (29), Ginowan City (27), and Kadena Town (24). Naha City still attracted many off-site rallies due to its political centrality as the prefecture capital (Cluster C1), but Ginowan City and Kadena Town became the major places of on/off-site protest in the Central Region. The number of rally participants in these places was sometimes very large (more than 10,000). As mentioned above, party-affiliated SMOs organized on-site protest against military exercises around Kin Village in the early 1990s. Nago City became one of the major places of protest at the end of the 1990s after it was designated as a candidate municipality to accept a new base (Cluster B).

Third, local cities in the Sakishima Region (islands remote from Okinawa Island) such as Hirara and Ishigaki Cities were not so politically active due to the fact that the region has few U.S. military facilities. However, party-affiliated SMOs organized rallies in these cities (Cluster D2). These SMOs were in most cases local branches of prefecture-wide SMOs. Nago City, the central place in the North Region, had also been less politically active until the transfer of the Futenma Air Station to the city (the Henoko area) became controversial in the late 1990s. This promoted the formation of new locally-based SMOs¹⁴ in the formerly quiet city. The existence or formation of

¹² “Party-affiliated” means that SMOs are affiliated with reformist (leftist) parties such as the Social Democratic Party of Japan and the Japan Communist Party. Anti-nuclear organizations and labor unions have been divided into social democrats and communists.

¹³ For Yomitan Village, five out of seven rallies were organized by municipal authorities or residents.

¹⁴ For instance, new civic groups such as *Hutami ihoku jukku no kai* (the Association of the Ten Districts North of Hutami) and *Herikichi kensetsu hantai kyogikai* (the Council for the Opposition to the Construction of a Helicopter Base) were organized in Nago City (the Henoko area) to oppose the planned new base. They are categorized as “residents” or “joint council”. The number of protest actions organized by such groups is 21 (out of 29 events) in Nago City.

such local SMOs became a premise that local cities and their surrounding areas could be politically mobilized although the size of participants tended to be small (mostly fewer than 1000).

During this period, there were two distinct peaks of collective action (Figure 5). One was a prefecture-wide reaction to the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen in 1995, and the other was a series of oppositions to the intra-prefecture transfer of the Futenma Air Station after 1996. As a result of the first peak, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed to close the Futenma Air Station and transfer it to somewhere else in Japan. However, because the Japanese government attempted to find a site for a new base within Okinawa, several municipalities that were thought of as a host of the base began to oppose the plan.

For the first peak, there was a concentration of rallies against the sexual violence from September to November 1995. From the beginning, prefecture-wide SMOs organized rallies, which finally developed into a large-scale rally with reportedly more than 85,000 participants. Issues commonly emphasized in these rallies included the blaming of the crime for representing the discriminative treatment against Okinawa by the Japanese and U.S. governments and the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement which provides that the legal status of U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan be protected according to the U.S. Constitution, not to the Japanese legal system. The statement of the large-scale rally said:

The spirit of our Okinawa represents the construction of peaceful Okinawa without weapons and the desire that the whole world should also become so. We are confident that realizing it is the only way to share the future of all human beings and the earth with Asia including us, more than 1.2 million Okinawans, and the whole world. In order not to repeat the tragedy of the girl we blame the assault against the girl by the U.S. military and request the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. We strongly advocate that the spirit of Okinawa be accepted as the spirit of the whole world. (The appeal adopted in the General Pep Rally for Prefecture People organized by the Rally Planning Committee in Ginowan City, *Okinawa Taimusu* 10/22/1995: 6)

11 rallies were held on this matter in Naha City (4 events), Ginowan City (3), Hirara City (2), Okinawa (formerly Koza) City (1), and Urazoe City (1). All of the rallies were held in major cities in Okinawa and most of them were organized by labor unions and/or union-related organizations. There can be seen a clear tendency of 'localized centralization.'

Regarding the second peak, local towns and villages quickly opposed to the Japanese government's plan that the Futenma Air Station would be transferred to one of them. Because these towns and villages had already had part of their land occupied by U.S. bases, the reason for their

opposition was quite obvious: no further increase or strengthening of U.S. bases. There were 57 rallies organized against the transfer plan from 1996-2000. In 1996, rallies against the governmental plan begun to be staged in local cities, towns, and villages such as Kadena Town, Yomitan Village, Nago City, Kin Village, Chatan Town, Katsuren Town, and Ginowan City. Most of these rallies were organized by municipal authorities. The framing of discontent by these municipalities expressed their outright opposition to the transfer:

People in Okinawa Prefecture have been oppressed and discriminated against by the base policies shaped by the Japanese and U.S. governments. Against this new imposition of the construction of a new air station, village people now decide that they will take a step for a new struggle in order to protect the environment of their own life and their physical environment and to build the bright future for their children. And they strongly protest against the governments' construction plan of the new air station in the Yomitan region after the closure of the Futenma Air Station and request the withdrawal of the plan. (The resolution of the rally organized by Yomitan Village Government and other organizations in Yomitan Village, *Okinawa Taimusu* 5/20/1996: 20)

After candidates for the new base were narrowed down to Nago City, rallies were staged by municipal authorities or local SMOs in Nago City or by joint associations of various SMOs in Naha City. Here we can see a co-existence of two location strategies: localization and centralization. However, there was no rally statement that was issued in Naha City and reported in the *Okinawa Taimusu*. This may suggest that the issue was not so centralized, therefore marginalized, and that public attention at that time was paid to the localized aspects of the protest. After 2000, local SMOs in Nago City (the Henoko area) explicitly referred to the damage of the construction of the new base to the maritime environment of the region, and collective action in Nago City turned more into a movement to protect the physical environment of the Henoko area.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the postwar global deployment of U.S. military forces has had particular geographical patterns that reflected the geopolitical interests of the U.S. and the states hosting its forces according to the contemporary international affairs. Since such host states allow U.S. forces to be stationed within their territories, global U.S. military deployment can have local impacts. One of such impacts is the resistance of local residents and/or activists against U.S. military presence in their localities. Thus, the global deployment of U.S. military forces constitutes a structure in which local protest against it takes place.

Okinawa Prefecture in Japan has hosted many U.S. military bases and installations under

the Japan-U.S. security arrangements since the end of World War II and can provide an appropriate example to understand the interaction between global military deployment and local protest. Using the case of Okinawa, I first examined *how political struggle is organized spatially or geographically*. According to the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses on the spatio-temporal development of social movement in Okinawa, Japan, there are several notable tendencies that can be summarized as centralization and localization. From 1949-1959, protest against forcible land seizure by U.S. military forces first took place in local villages but gradually developed into the prefecture-wide land struggle staged in major cities, particularly Naha City. Although the orientation of collective action towards Naha City had been maintained until the period from 1990-2000, the orientation towards the Central Region of Okinawa Island appeared in the 1960s and became stronger over time.

I then examined *what kind of space or geography is chosen and how it is used as social movement strategy*. The orientation of collective action towards Naha City is not necessarily peculiar to Okinawa. In general, capital cities often become the center of nationalized social movement due to their political centrality and the possibility to maximize participants, media coverage, social impacts, etc. Okinawan protest organizers had always utilized such political centrality of Naha City. The tendency of localization from 1960-1974, especially in the reversion movement in the 1960s, was brought about by the location strategy of *Fukkikyo* (Kyan 1966). *Fukkikyo* attempted to extend their movement all over Okinawa (including the Sakishima Region) by intentionally localizing their demonstrations. This can be regarded as the politics of scale to strengthen the reversion movement.

After reversion, the anti-nuclear/peace movement as the residue of the radicalized reversion movement continued to organize protest against U.S. military presence. But the shift of protest target to U.S. bases and the ideological split of SMOs such as *Gensuikyo* and labor unions changed the geography of protest significantly in the 1980s; on-site rallies were staged around U.S. bases in the Central and North Region but fragmented and reduced in size.

From 1991-2000, as the status of Naha City relatively declined, major cities in the other Regions were chosen as the sites of protest by prefecture-wide SMOs indicating the 'localized centralization' of protest. The large-scale rally with 85,000 participants against the rape in 1995 was organized not in Naha City but Ginowan City. Although this paper cannot present documental evidence for this shift in location strategy, it is obvious that SMOs attempt to produce the prefecture-wide scale of protest. In other words, SMOs came to utilize the urban hierarchy or network within Okinawa Prefecture in order to maximize the effect of their protest. On the other hand, on-site protest by local residents and municipal authorities had been organized since 1949 in order to protect the life of the residents from the direct damages caused by U.S. bases.

Given the above-mentioned spatial patterns of protest and related location strategies, *how are such location strategies connected to the more ideational aspects of social movement* or, in other

words, *how do the causes of social movement affect its location strategies?* The common aspect seen throughout the periods (1949-2000) is that the centralization of protest towards Naha City by prefecture-wide SMOs usually accompanied the abstraction and universalization of the causes of protest. This is probably because they needed the causes to be shared by as many people in the prefecture as possible. In contrast, the causes of localized on-site protest organized by residents and /or municipal authorities were often based on the direct damages from U.S. bases to the life of the residents. In the latter case, the location of protest was not the matter of strategy but the place of life itself. As shown above, even though prefecture-wide SMOs sometimes staged on-site rallies in rural areas in order to support the protest by local residents, they usually expressed the causes of the protest in more abstract terms. In this sense, the apparent localization of the location strategies of prefecture-wide SMOs was not necessarily rooted in the localities where they staged protest.

Lastly, *what kind of implications do the spatiality or geography of struggle have to the understanding of social movement?* As I mentioned earlier, studies on social movement have paid little attention to the spatial or geographical dimension of social movement. However, as I have shown, there is a recognizable spatiality or geography in social movement which is related to the causes and location strategies of the movement. Although this paper only points out and describes such dimension of social movement, other data I collected for this paper show that the spatiality or geography of social movement is more than a phenomenal dimension. Such location strategies are carefully considered and intentionally chosen to maximize the effect of the movement. Therefore, the understanding of the spatial or geographical dimension of social movement is a first step towards the understanding of its strategic dimension. I will explain it in my next paper.

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
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Figure 1. The location of Okinawa Island (left) and U.S. bases and installations in 1964 (right).



Source: Yoshida (2001: xxx).

Figure 2a. U.S. military bases and installations on Okinawa Island.






Figure 2b. Municipalities in Okinawa Prefecture.



North Region: 8. Nago. 11. Kunigami. 12. Ogimi. 13. Higashi. 14. Nakijin. 15. Motobu. 16. Onna. 17. Ginoza. 18. Kin.
Central Region: 2. Ishikawa. 3. Gushikawa. 4. Ginowan. 7. Urasoe. 10. Okinawa. 20. Yonashiro. 21. Katsuren. 22. Yomitan. 23. Kadena. 24. Chatan. 25. Kitanakagusuku. 26. Nakagusuku. 27. Nishihara.
South Region: 9. Itoman. 28. Tomigusuku. 29. Kochinda. 30. Gushikami. 31. Tamagusuku. 32. Chinen. 33. Sashiki. 34. Yonabaru. 35. Ozato. 36. Haebaru.
Sakishima Region: 5. Hira. 6. Ishigaki. 47. Gusukube. 48. Shimoji. 49. Ueno. 50. Irabu. 51. Tarama. 52. Taketomi. 53. Yonaguni.
Isolated Islands: 19. Ie. 37. Nakazato. 38. Gushikawa. 39. Tokashiki. 40. Zamami. 41. Aguni. 42. Tonaki. 43. Minami-daito. 44. Kita-daito. 45. Iheya. 46. Izena.


Note: No. 1 to 10 are administrative cities (as of 2000.)

Figure 3. U.S. troop deployment in the 1960s (top) and 1990s (bottom).




Unit: troop-years
Source: Kane (2006).

Figure 4. The area of U.S. military bases and installations in Japan 1945-1998.




Source: Okinawa-ken (2000).

Figure 5. Collective action events in Okinawa 1949-2000.



Sources: The *Okinawa Taimusu* each year and Yamazaki (2004).

Figure 6. Spatial development of collective action in the 1960s (top) and 1980s (bottom).



Sources: The *Okinawa Taimusu* each year and Yamazaki (2004).

Table 1. Components and categories of collective action 1949-2000.

<i>Component</i>	Category	Items	%	Note
<i>Year</i>				<i>Year when protest occurred.</i>
	1949-54	14	1.0	
	1955-59	41	3.0	
	1960-64	79	5.7	
	1965-69	188	13.6	
	1970-74	191	13.8	
	1975-79	125	9.0	
	1980-84	121	8.7	
	1985-89	281	20.3	
	1990-94	139	10.1	
	1995-2000	204	14.8	
<i>Issue</i>				<i>1st issue of protest</i>
	BASE	569	41.1	Military practice, bomber/submarine arrival, etc.
	PEACE	164	11.9	Anti-war/peace
	REVERSION	115	8.3	Reversion to Japan
	LAND	99	7.2	Forcible use of land
	ACCIDENT	80	5.8	Accident/crime related to bases
	SDF	70	5.1	The Self Defense Forces
	REMOVAL	61	4.4	Removal of base
	REGULATION	49	3.5	Regulation on protest
	VIP	30	2.2	Visit of VIP
	AUTONOMY	34	2.5	Okinawa's autonomy
	BASE EMP	14	1.0	Base employment
	STRIKE	31	2.2	Strike
	NTL EVENT	26	1.9	National event
	Other issues	41	3.0	
<i>2nd issue</i>				<i>2nd issue of protest if any</i>
	BASE2	20	1.4	BASE as a second issue
	PEACE2	17	1.2	PEACE as a second issue
	REVERSION2	4	0.3	REVERSION as a second issue
	LAND2	2	0.1	LAND as second issue
	VIP2	10	0.7	VIP as a second issue
	BASE EMP2	12	0.9	BASE EMP as a second issue
	No second issue	1318	95.3	
<i>Organizer</i>				<i>1st organizer of protest</i>
	Anti-nuclear org	472	34.1	Anti-nuclear/war organization
	Joint council	147	10.6	Joint council
	Land council	32	2.3	Land-related council
	Landowner	12	0.9	Landowners
	Labor union	189	13.7	Labor union
	Municipality	80	5.8	Municipality
	Party	15	1.1	Political party
	Residents	123	8.9	Residents
	Reversion org	125	9.0	Reversion organization
	Student assoc	51	3.7	Student association
	Teachers assoc	40	2.9	Teachers association
	Women	14	1.0	Women's group
	Other org	54	3.9	Other organizations
	Unreported	29	2.1	This category includes individuals.
Total		1383	100.0	

Table 1. Components and categories of collective action 1949-2000 (cont'd).

<i>Component</i>	Category	Items	%	Note
<i>Activity scale</i>				<i>The activity scale of organizer</i>
	Sub-municipal	82	5.9	
	Municipal	189	13.7	
	Sub-prefecture	187	13.5	
	Prefecture	815	58.9	
	National	14	1.0	
	Unreported	96	6.9	
<i>Site of protest</i>				<i>The nature of the place where protest occurred.</i>
	ON-SITE	658	47.6	On-site
	CAPITAL	296	21.4	The capital
	GRI/OPG	122	8.8	The office of the Okinawan government
	BORDER	13	0.9	Hento Point or offshore
	MABUNI	4	0.3	The Peace Memorial Park (Mabuni)
	GOJ	29	2.1	The local branch of the Japanese government
	LOCAL CITY	212	15.3	Local city/town
	PREFECTURE	18	1.3	Prefecture-wide
	USCAR	9	0.7	The U.S. Civil Administration facility
	USMH	12	0.9	The U.S. Marine Headquarters
	Unreported	10	0.7	
<i>Place of protest</i>				<i>The place where protest occurred. More than 1%.</i>
	Kunigami	21	1.5	
	Motobu	14	1.0	
	Nago	49	3.5	
	Ginoza	14	1.0	
	Kisenbaru	31	2.2	The Kisenbaru area
	Kin	143	10.3	
	Onna	38	2.7	
	Katsuren	37	2.7	
	Gushikawa C.	19	1.4	Gushikawa City
	Yomitan	50	3.6	
	Kadena	111	8.0	
	Okinawa C.	54	3.9	Okinawa City
	Chatan	19	1.4	
	Kitanakagusuku	14	1.0	
	Ginowan	67	4.8	
	Urazoe	21	1.5	
	Naha	488	35.3	
	Itoman	17	1.2	
	Sakihsima	93	6.7	The Sakishima Region
	Okinawa Is.	19	1.4	Okinawa Island at large
	Other places	64	4.6	This category includes "Unreported."
<i>Size of protest</i>				<i>Number of participants</i>
	Less than 100	302	21.8	
	100-999	515	37.2	
	1,000-4,999	205	14.8	
	5,000-9,999	64	4.6	
	10,000-49,999	68	4.9	
	50,000 or more	21	1.5	
	Unreported	208	15.0	
Total		1383	100.0	

Table 2. Clusters of collective action categories 1949-1959.

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>2nd issue</i>	<i>Organizer</i>	<i>Activity scale</i>	<i>Site of protest</i>	<i>Place of protest</i>	<i>Size</i>
A								
A1		PEACE		Anti-nuclear org	Prefecture	Capital	Naha	10000-49999
A2	1955-59	LAND		Landowner Other org Land council				1000-4999
B	1949-54	REVERSION		Reversion org Joint council				
C				Municipality Residents	Sub-municipal Municipal	GRI/OPG ON-SITE		<100
D				Party				50000+
E								
E1		ACCIDENT			Sub-prefecture	LOCAL CITY	Okinawa C. Sakishima	
E2				Teachers assoc			Gushikawa C.	100-999 5000-9999
F		REGULATION	LAND2	Student assoc				

Table 3. Clusters of collective action categories 1960-1974.

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>2nd issue</i>	<i>Organizer</i>	<i>Activity scale of organizer</i>	<i>Site of protest</i>	<i>Place of protest</i>	<i>Size</i>
A								
A1		BASE		Residents		ON-SITE	Kadena Chatan Yomitan Kin	
A2		ACCIDENT	BASE2	Municipality	Sub-municipal Municipality		Okinawa C. Ishikawa	
A3	1970-74	SDF					Remote is.	100-999 <100
A4		LAND					Gushikawa C.	
B								
B1	1960-64	PEACE		Landowner Land council Student assoc		USCAR	Itoman Urasoe	
B2	1965-69	VIP REGULATION			National			
B3		AUTONOMY REVERSION		Joint council Reversion org Anti-nuclear org	Prefecture			1000-4999 10000-49999
C				Party		CAPITAL GRI/OPG BORDER	Naha	5000-9999 50000+
D		BASE EMP					Off shore Kunigami	
E			PEACE2	Other org Teachers assoc	Sub-prefecture	LOCAL CITY	Ginowan Sakishima Nago	
F		STRIKE	BASE EMP2	Labor union		PRE	Okinawa is.	

Table 4. Clusters of collective action categories 1975-1990.

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>2nd issue</i>	<i>Organizer</i>	<i>Activity scale of organizer</i>	<i>Site of protest</i>	<i>Place of protest</i>	<i>Size</i>
A								
A1	1985-89 1990-94 1980-84	BASE PEACE		Labor union	Sub-prefecture	ON-SITE	Chatan Kadena Okinawa C.	100-999
A2				Anti-nuclear org GOJ	Prefecture		Katsuren Kin Kisenbaru	<100
B								
B1		ACCIDENT		Municipality	Municipal		Yomitan Ginowan Nago Kunigami	
B2				Residents	Sub-municipal		Ginoza Onna	
C		REVERSION				LOCAL CITY	Sakishima	5000-9999
D	1975-79	LAND SDF VIP	BASE2	Joint council Land council		GRI/OPG CAPITAL	Naha	1000-4999 10000-49999
F		NTL EVENT	VIP2	Other org Student assoc			Motobu	

Table 5. Clusters of collective action categories 1991-2000.

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>2nd issue</i>	<i>Organizer</i>	<i>Activity scale of organizer</i>	<i>Site of protest</i>	<i>Place of protest</i>	<i>Size</i>
A								
A1	1990-94	BASE		Anti-nuclear org			Kadena Onna Kin	<100
A2					Sub-municipal	ON-SITE	Katsuren	
B		REMOVAL		Municipality Residents	Municipal		Nago Yomitan	
C								
C1	1995-2000			Joint council			Ginowan	10000-49999 1000-4999
C2		LAND			Prefecture	GRI/OPG CAPITAL GOJ	Naha	5000-9999
C3		PEACE NTL EVENT SDF		Other org				
D								
D1		ACCIDENT	BASE2				Okinawa C.	
D2				Labor union Teachers assoc	Sub-prefecture	LOCAL CITY	Urasoe Sakishima	100-999
E								
E1				Women				
E2						USMH	Kitanakagusuku	