

## The First International Workshop on Time

Date : 4th November (Sun), 10:00–18:00

Venue : Conference Room (2F), Tanaka Memorial Hall, OCU

### Timetable

10:00–10:10	Opening Remark	
10:10–11:00	Takeshi Sakon	Presentism and Spatialization of Time
11:00–12:00	Natalja Deng	What Is Temporal Ontology?
12:00–13:30	(Lunch Time)	
13:30–14:30	Samuel Baron	The Metaphysics of Spacetime Emergence
14:30–15:30	Kunihisa Morita	Problems with Intrinsic Time Direction in Dynamic Views of Time
15:30–15:50	(Tea Time)	
15:50–16:50	Adrian Bardon	Is the Passage of Time an Illusion?
16:50–17:50	Akiko Frischhut	Nothing Quite Like It: A Deflationist Defence of Experiencing Temporal Passage
17:50–18:00	Concluding Remark	

## Abstracts

### 1. Takeshi Sakon: "Presentism and Spatialization of Time"

The battle line for contemporary debate on time is usually drawn between the so-called tensed and tenseless theories. Although this dichotomy remains important since McTaggart, there is another way to see the matter. The question for the turning point is whether and how one can accept or reject Spatialization of Time. While there are several recent attempts to redefine presentism and its rival theories, I suggest that presentism should be best understood as Anti-Spatialization of Time and other theories are taken to involve different versions of Spatialization of Time, which may open a new debate on time.

### 2. Natalja Deng: "What Is Temporal Ontology?"

Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it's surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and eternalists (to focus on the most widespread positions). Certain events happened that are not happening now; what is it to disagree about whether these events exist (simpliciter, or else tenselessly)? In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic metaphysics, skeptics' doubts about this debate have not generally been heeded, neither by metaphysicians, nor by philosophers of physics. This paper revisits the question in the light of prominent elucidation attempts from both camps (by Ted Sider, Christian Wüthrich, and Tom Stoneham). The upshot is that skeptics were right to be puzzled. The paper then explores a possible re-interpretation of positions in temporal ontology that links it to normative views about how we should live as temporal beings.

### 3. Samuel Baron: "The Metaphysics of Spacetime Emergence"

Recent developments in physics suggest that spacetime is not fundamental but arises from a fundamental reality that lacks spatial, temporal and spatiotemporal properties. I argue that standard metaphysical accounts of emergence won't work for the emergence of spacetime and so a new metaphysics is needed.

#### 4. Kunihiisa Morita: “Problems with Intrinsic Time Direction in Dynamic Views of Time”

There are three main ways to understand the direction of time: the thermodynamic direction, in which entropy increases over time; the psychological direction, in which we remember only the past; and the causal direction, where cause is always antecedent to its effect. Frequent discussions have considered the ways in which these three understandings align, which is most fundamental, and whether all three are objectively real. The purpose of this paper is to show that proponents of the dynamic view of time, who insist that time’s passing is objective, lack a clear understanding of time’s direction even if these above questions are satisfactorily resolved. That is, more explanation is needed regarding why these three directions and the intrinsic direction of time built into the dynamic view coincide. This problem is difficult for dynamists to satisfactorily solve, since their theories depend on the assumption that the future is open and the past is fixed. However, if one assumes that physics can completely describe the world, then if the past is fixed the future must be fixed, and vice versa. The differences between the future and past vanish, meaning the dynamic view cannot explain the above problem.

#### 5. Adrian Bardon: “Is the Passage of Time an Illusion?”

My position is that there is no experience of the passage of time. This position is called “veridicalism”, in that our experience of the world conforms to the way it really is: namely, timeless. In this presentation, however, I investigate the hypothesis that there is an experience of the passage of time, and that it is an illusion—specifically, a type of cognitive illusion known as “perceptual completion”. I examine the prospects for a proposed empirical test of this hypothesis. I contextualize this discussion within a larger discussion of what we know about consciousness and illusion, and how what we know about consciousness may impact our understanding of temporal experience.

#### 6. Akiko Frischhut: “Nothing Quite Like It: A Deflationist Account of Experiencing Temporal Passage”

This talk concerns the question whether we can (perceptually) experience the passage of time. I argue that we do not represent passage and, perhaps more radically, there is no unique ‘what it’s like’ of temporal passage either. Instead we form the erroneous belief that time passes on the basis of our experience of ordinary temporal phenomena, in particular from the experience of succession.