

How Space Affects Politics: Themes in American Political Geography

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This is a transcript of the lecture given by Professor John Agnew at the Academic Extension Center of Osaka City University, Japan on November 28, 2015. Publication permission has been granted by Professor Agnew. The transcribed manuscript was fully reviewed; and necessary correction and modification were added. For Japanese readers, a short explanatory note in Japanese is attached to the end of this transcript.

I. What was/is Political Geography

Thank you very much for inviting me to Osaka. So what I had in mind today is really to give something of an overview of political geography in the United States. So my claims are not beyond the borders of the United States in terms of the trends of the field. What I would like to do is to start out with something about the prehistory of political geography, in this case not just in the United States but more generally. Because, I think, around the world until, really, quite recently, the 1960s and 1970s political geography in many ways would become very much associated with its past, and in particular the fact that it grew up in this period of time, particularly from the 1890s to the 1940s that I and other people have called the period of inter-imperial rivalry. So that in many ways political geography was tied to the geopolitical period in which the word itself became associated with the subject of the study.

And so I list here some of the connotations that political geography came to have particularly in the 1940s and the 1950s. So thus this was here. First of all, imperial rivalry is a kind of basic feature of world politics. Lying behind this was a very strong environmental determinism, particularly the idea or ideas such as the distinction between sea and land powers was very important one; one could identify countries with a particular type of power. So Britain and Japan were seen as sea powers and Germany and Russia as land powers, for example. Thirdly, geopolitics was really the central feature of political geography

to the extent that the word 'political geography' and the word 'geopolitics' really were not readily distinguishable from one and another, even though many people who used the term 'political geography,' the British geographer Mackinder is a good example. [He] never used the word geopolitics. I mean, it never occurred in any of his writings or in any of his speeches. But in the popular imagination it did get that association. The focus was heavily on the behavior of the so-called great powers, the world's most powerful countries rather than anyone else pretty much. It had very strong associations in all of the countries where it took root, all of them – not just Japan and Germany, which is the way in which it's often told, but also in Britain and the United States – with nationalism, with exceptionalism; not only we're different from other people but we're better than other people. And then finally, particularly in Germany and in Britain where it was really quite a strong subject in the inter-war period in the 1920s and the 1930s, it also was very Eurocentric. So for example, there was a tendency there to dismiss Japan as not really having any great significance because often connected to the environmental determinism was also a very deep-seated racism, about the superiority of Europeans and so on. So these were very important features of classical political geography.

Perhaps one of the most important things that lead to its discrediting was the idea that you could both be kind of scientific and objective claiming that this or that country was the land power or sea power, to use that example. And yet

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at the same time most of the people who were active in political geography were very much proponents of their own particular country. So it was always read through the glasses, if you like, of Britain or Germany or Japan and so on and so forth. And so there was this attempt to try and to bring together a sort of objective view of the world, scientific view of the world, but using it in a sense for a particular country's interests or stakes in the world. Now this was precisely what made political geography popular with political leaders, but it was precisely what after World War II came to discredit the field, I think. That's the point.

So in the United States down until the 1960s teaching political geography largely disappeared. There were two or three text books but they were largely just descriptions of different countries around the world. To the extent there was a tradition, it was a continuation of Isaiah Bowman's kind of political geography, which was mainly sort of lists of characteristics of places, border disputes of one sort or another, a little discussion of the status of different countries in terms of their geopolitical position, but that was about it. In my own case, for example, as an undergraduate I never had a course in political geography, simply because the university I attended didn't teach it; there was no course. And so it was only in late 1960s that the subject began to revive, people started to use the term again, political geography, and we'll talk in a minute about the types of work or research that were talked about. But at the moment I just want to talk a little bit about why I think it – why did it revive? I mean, why didn't it just completely die? And I think there are a number of reasons and I'll just go into those now.

So I think there are a number of reasons why there was a revival of interest in trying to connect together questions – political questions on the one side and questions of space and territory on the other. One of these was the end of, the collapse of the European empires in the 1960s, particularly the British and French empires and trying to explain – trying to understand how this happened. It made the world suddenly seem much more dynamic and less fixed than it had

been in the years right after World War II. I think that's important. Secondly, the Cold War really took a very different turn, that's the conflict between the United States and its allies on the one side and Soviet Union and its allies on the other, took a very different turn in the late 1960s and early 1970s – away from just a kind of sense of perpetual confrontation, the emergence particularly of conflicts in the so-called Third World. And people were beginning to try and understand how the world itself was being divided up into these different spheres of influence and interest. The Soviet Union on its side, the United States on its side and then the so-called Third World in-between. And in particular, the conflict between China and the Soviet Union beginning in the late 1950s really undermined the idea of a completely homogenous communist world. Particularly in the United States, I think, this was important, the Sino-Soviet dispute, where it became apparent that there were other issues besides the questions of U.S. versus Soviet style economic organization and so on.

And I think another thing that happened in the 1960s – and particularly in the United States and in Western Europe – was an increasing self-criticism of the nature of the societies themselves, particularly in the U.S. The Civil Rights movement was questioning the use of language that had been used to present the United States in relation to the rest of the world: land of freedom, land of democracy and so on. Here were people who were saying, "Well, we don't get to vote." I mean it's very difficult for African Americans in many parts of the America South to register to vote. How is that different from Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union? And so I think this again created a sense of crisis in the image of a set of stable, geographical categories between the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States on the other. And then finally, I think an important factor partly associated with decolonization, but also with a kind of increasing crisis within so-called western countries as well was a revival of nationalism, often of a kind of small-nation nationalism. In the case of Europe the beginnings of – revival of Irish nationalism,

Scottish nationalism, Basque nationalism in Spain, the increased frictions between language groups in Belgium; all of these things began in the 1960s. So there was an increasing sense, and ironically, that the world that we thought was spatially fixed, territorially fixed was in fact much more mobile, much more labile than it previously had been the case, and you need to have somebody who took an interest in explaining why this was the case. Well, how do we understand these kinds of dynamics?

II. Five subject-areas of political geography today

So what I'd like to do is now to provide something of the historical background and what I'd like to do for the rest of my time today in the presentation is to say something briefly about each of these – I'll come back to these and look at examples of them in a minute – of the subject areas that emerged beginning in the 1960s, so we still have some traditional ones, 'geopolitics.' This 'spatial/territorial organization of states and empires' [is approached] not just in terms of state formation but in terms of how they're organized internally: federal versus unitary systems, systems of local government and so on and so forth. But the new topic – so usually considered under these three at the bottom, 'geographies of social and political movements,' part of which is so-called electoral geography, looking at election results and trying to use them as a way of trying to understand social and political change. [The next subject area concerns] how people become attached to particular places and the political identities that are associated with them. And then finally, 'geographies of nationalism and ethnic conflict' has become a really major area of study in political geography.

And I would argue that all of these – the form studying these has taken, we'll see in a minute – is a response to exactly these new challenges or new problems that emerged beginning in the 1960s. So there is a connection between political geography, if you like, on the one hand, the

academic political geography on the one hand, and then the world and what's happening in it on the other. This isn't a world separate from the real world as we often think of them. We have the phrase 'ivory tower' for the university. But in fact a part of the argument of my book *Making Political Geography* is that political geography is like a kind of dialectic or a dance, if you like, between trying to understand the world and the world itself, so that there's a kind of attempt anywhere trying to keep these together, even as the world itself is changing then political geography has changed as well.

III. Three theoretical perspectives

1. Spatial-analytic perspective

So I'm going to return to these shortly because this is going to be the main way in which I'm going to organize looking at some examples of thinking in a kind of political geographical way about these. But before I do that, I just want to talk about the three theoretical and methodological perspectives that have risen within American political geography since the 1960s. In a strange way each kind has come in sequence. So what I'm going to call the spatial-analytic approach really dates from the 1960s and 1970s. The political-economic, which I'll explain in a little bit more in a minute, really from the 1970s and 80s and then the so-called postmodern [approach] is really from the 1990s to the present. But I think it's a mistake to think of these as somehow one replacing the other. That's not what I have in mind. As each has risen, there's still lots of research that's being done across these traditions. So there's still a lot of spatial-analytic research, political-economic, and so on. So it's not that one is being replaced by the other. I think that's a very important point. That's the first point.

The second point is that these are, in a sense, heuristic devices. It's a way of creating, simplifying a much more complex set of theoretical perspectives. And there are inevitable overlaps

between these. So again, I don't want to leave you with the impression that these are completely separate positions because there's some research that overlaps these categories. So these categories are just a convention, a way of trying to make sense of a much more complex sort of set of positions. So maybe you can say something about that and then I'll come back and try and describe each of these. But those caveats are very important to me.

So these three positions, these three perspectives then are bearing those two points in mind that they're overlapping rather than completely separate, really are about different strategies as well as emphasis in terms of thinking about the various subject areas that we're going to return to in a moment. The spatial-analytic perspective really begins with a map. There is always a map to start with. I mean one of the things that makes all of these positions in a way geographical is that they are all about maps or about cartography. So in a sense we've inherited from the past a heavy reliance on visualizing relations in the world in terms of mapping or mapping strategies. But the spatial-analytic perspective always begins with a map. One starts with a map and in a way you're always – and this is one of the criticisms of the position often, you end with the map because the map is the way in which you interpret things. So for example, the whole area of GIS in contemporary geography is about layers, putting layers on a map, of having some underlying relationship that you are interested in and showing by correlating, essentially through geo-correlation, by showing how things are related to one another. So that's what I mean by spatial-analytic because it is very analytical, but it's based on in essence putting various empirical indicators together on a map. And all of this, I hope, will become clear when we look at some examples. But that's what I mean by the spatial-analytic approach.

2. Political-economic perspective

The second perspective really grew up as a reaction against the spatial-analytic. So in geography, I mean this label is often most associated with, in American geography, writers like David

Harvey or Neil Smith. Some of you have probably heard of them or in political geography perhaps most importantly, Peter Taylor. So you're probably familiar with some of these names. And it was very much a critique of spatial analysis mainly because from this perspective space itself really doesn't matter. Space is always about outcomes of more profound political and economic processes. So a question is relating to the interests of different groups, particularly of social classes but of other groups of business interests and so on, and the political struggles between such interests on the one hand and then competing ones on the other, so that the map then is an outcome; the map appears at the end. It's the end product rather than the beginning. So from this point of view what you're trying to do is to establish the connections between a particular phenomenon, like some of the things we'll look at in a minute, and a different subject; here is like votes for different parties. These are going to be the result of people supporting or not supporting political parties on the basis of their economic interests, just to use – that's a very simple example for that – the one you could use.

3. Postmodern perspective

And the postmodern perspective really begins as a critique of both of the others. From this point of view, the focus here is that there's something missing. There's something missing from both of the other perspectives, which is the role of human consciousness and human language, particularly the way we represent the world. We don't approach the world as a blank slate, which in many ways is the assumption of human behavior that lies behind the first two. Now we approach with all kinds of assumptions, cultural, ideological assumptions about the world, and these are actually wired into the language that we use. So the language that we use to describe the world and try to understand the world has also then to be part of how we explain or understand the world. So the emphasis here is very much on dominant source of narratives, stories, discourses, sometimes the term that you use, so that for example if you want to understand, as we'll talk in a few

minutes with a good example I think, something like nationalism, you can't just take a vote for a nationalist party as given without understanding "What is it that they're appealing to?" "What kind of representations are at stake?" "Where did these come from?" and "How did they arise in the first place?" So the postmodern perspective then shifts the focus away from the map as the starting point as with the spatial-analytic or as an outcome in the political-economic, to ask "How do we construct the map in the first place?" "What assumptions go into our kind of way of structuring the world?" And these are usually collective representations associated with a particular powerful group or a powerful country that then, in a sense, imposes these sorts of representations on the rest of the world.

IV. Connecting theoretical perspectives and subject-areas in Political Geography

1. Geopolitics

So what I'd like to do next before coming back to these three emerging things at the end is to go through the different subject-areas and the three theoretical perspectives just to try and give, I think, a better understanding from a more empirical point of view, because I think one of the things about – that remains true of political geography is that it remains – even though we're interested in these theoretical perspectives, we're also very interested in empirical material as well. So in that way I think we're trying to preserve a connection, which I think is part of the geographical tradition, which is always to be engaging with the world, never to be just engaging in some kind of theoretical debate, like one fine same philosophy or something. So for me this is a very important part of political geography that it remains in a sense engaged with the world rather than in a sense isolating itself from it.

So briefly anyway I want to go through just giving an example of each of the perspectives, each of the theoretical perspectives, the three

theoretical perspectives in relation to different subject areas. So here even though he is a representative of classical political geography, Mackinder's model of the heartland here, which is probably familiar to most political geographers, is very much a kind of spatial analysis. I mean it doesn't really – it may make some assumptions, some political, economic assumptions about – particularly about the role of railways. But that's about it. I mean mainly it's about dominating land area as opposed to – and the Eurasia, obviously in this case, as opposed to being a sea power. Mackinder of course was interested in the prospects of the British empire and that was what was driving his research; it wasn't disinterested search for truth, something like that. But he was very worried about the rise of Germany and so that was the immediate context for his drawing of this particular map.

But this is a map that begins and ends. I mean it's very much a kind of equivalent of what we can think of as spatial analysis. The basic breakdown here is between land and sea powers, and the threat that's now posed to sea powers, of which he has Britain very much in mind, by the rise of Germany which he sees as the quintessential land power. So even though this map predates the three theoretical perspectives – I'm not sure Mackinder would see himself in that category – one can see his map as an example of a kind of spatial analysis. And of the attraction of it, it's a very simple and seductive idea based on a kind of opposition of – what's seen as a fundamental opposition, and yet in this opposition often, as many people have pointed out, doesn't stand up to very close scrutiny. I mean, none of these powers ever was completely one of the other, a land power or a sea power. And then the rise of air power of course turns the whole thing into something less than convincing. But nevertheless it's an example of using a map as a kind of form or persuasive cartography and I introduce it here mainly just as to point out the degree to which there is some kind of continuity between classical political geography and more recent thinking.

If we turn now to the political-economic perspective on geopolitics, I have a couple of maps I

want to show. This is one which is taken from the French magazine *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and it has a lot of their cartographic conventions on it. But it focuses very much here on what's at stake in Asia in terms of U.S. policy towards China. So this map was drawn in the months following the so-called debate in the United States about the pivot to Asia – some of you probably remember that – which was a statement as if there was some kind of new American focus on East Asia. But the discussion here was very much in terms of bases and in terms of U.S. efforts containing China. So the model here was very much of containment.

But lurking behind this map was more of this map. So from a political-economic perspective it wasn't just about containing China militarily, but lurking in the background is much more; this is a measure of intra-Asian bilateral foreign direct investment flows. So lurking behind it is more the question of the economic rise in China, so that from a political-economic perspective U.S. policy, as illustrated in the first map, is in many ways responding much more to this. It's not about just the rise of China in some kind of abstract way as in previous perspective – if somebody else rises, you must fall, that kind of classic geopolitical argument. But here it's very much about the rise of China and the challenge in essence this poses to the whole U.S.-based world economy that has emerged in East Asia over the last 40 or 50 years. So China now interferes with the connectivities of Japan, Taiwan, interestingly Australia, New Zealand, and so on, rather than it just being a question of the rise of China as a military power. What matters here is very much what lies behind that, so that what I'm trying to get at here is that this map – behind this map lies this diagram, if you see what I mean. It's not this map in itself that tells you what's going on; it's this that tells you what's happening on the other map. So this is very much a kind of political-economic approach to geopolitics that lying behind what appear to be questions purely of military strategy are these questions of economic challenge.

And so that brings us here to the third, the postmodern perspective on geopolitics, and this

obviously something of a parody but it's a map again drawn in originally. The original was in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and is a map of the world according to the former American President, President Bush, in terms of friends and enemies among those who count around the world, using the sort of language that was used by the former President, outposts of tyranny, for example, for Cuba, North Korea, Myanmar, Belorussia, Iran and Zimbabwe, an interestingly eclectic list, places that were hostile to the U.S., but possibly useful subjects and then, of course, the greatest competitors to the U.S.

So if you like, this is an attempt of doing the mental map of the world of George W. Bush, and as I said, it's something of a parody. I'm not suggesting this as a serious analysis but what it does is to draw attention to the fact that the relations between states, the geopolitics of interstate relations, if you like, is always mediated by the sort of images and imaginations that political leaders bring to bear. So in this case you may remember a very famous speech – well, 'infamous speech' is a better way of putting it – that President Bush made about the so-called axis of evil. So here we have the language of morality imposed on the world map and that was also a very peculiar axis because it involved Iraq – this is before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein – Iraq, Iran and North Korea as a strange axis. But this is I think more interesting, an attempt at using an older language. You may remember the axis during World War II of Germany, Italy and Japan, the so-called Axis Powers. This was the term that was used in the United States. So here's an effort at also using a historical analogy to try and inform current American foreign policy, and I think that's an interesting aspect then of this perspective. So you can't just look at the world as if it's about interests and so on. It's about establishing identities and in this case all of this is about reinforcing a kind of American identity in relation to the rest of the world, in this case using language from previous periods when the United States was in battle in relation to the rest of the world. And so this map is from around that time, from around 2003, 2004, which some of you may remember.

2. Spatial/Territorial organization of states and empires

So moving on and doing the same kind of thing again, here we have the question of the political map of – in this case of Europe. And so from a spatial-analytic perspective what's interesting here is how of the form that this takes today, the shapes that the countries take and that how we can look at their characteristics, how they were formed in terms of, for example, their relative size, and the settlement distribution within them. Particularly important in this kind of approach would be the degree to which they are dominated by one city, a capital city typically. So at least in the original, France does appear on this map. And Paris of course dominates France, its absolute primate city. But in Germany for example there are quite a few cities of more or less the same size scattered across the country, which tells you something about the history of Germany. As a state it was bringing together in the 19th century a pre-existing set of states. And so Munich, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin are not that different in relative size and obviously, historically, Berlin became the most important of those cities, but of course, it shrank during the period when Germany was divided into eastern and western parts.

But the point here is that a spatial-analytic approach takes the map as it is and asks us something about the nature of the borders between these states, "What kind of border there is?" "How this border was established?" The internal organization of the territory, "Is it a unitary or is it a federal system?" and "How that connects to the question of the settlement structure of a particular country?" So again, what I should do here is to put a map of the settlement structure in particular and the degree to which a country is federal or unitary on top of this map. A very important example of this approach is that taken by the Norwegian political geographer/sociologist Stein Rokkan, who wrote a whole series of papers and a book on state formation in Europe, essentially making this kind of argument and saying that it reflected both a kind of east-west division within Europe – which is based around the

history of urbanization in Europe – and an urban belt flowing from Italy up through Germany and into the Netherlands, and then a north-south difference based around which parts of Europe were parts of the Roman empire and which parts were not. So it's a historical spatial analytic kind of approach, but it's about putting one map, if you like, on top of another and that's why I wanted to use this as an example.

The second example I have is about the unification of Italy. What I intended here was to show that in fact the unification of Italy, which finally took place in 1871, was a product really of a political-economic process and in particular the rise of the Kingdom of Sardinia, as it was called then, whose capital was Turin in Northwestern Italy. So the major agent for the unification of Italy was the government of the Kingdom of Sardinia. And Sardinia was just the island – it was the island of Sardinia down here, but more importantly a large part of the northwest of Italy, the area today around Turin and Genoa, so that part of Italy.

And in particular businesses located in that area in the mid-19th century were very concerned about building [a unified state] at a time when there was increasingly sort of national competition across Europe; remember this is the time also of the unification of Germany. So here the focus of state formation is on who was involved in it, who was, if you like, behind it. And the idea here is that there was a political economic elite in Northwestern Italy who became the major agents then of trying to put together what had historically been a very politically fragmented state.

And of course the big challenge that they faced was the papacy. So the big problem in unifying Italy as it had been for a long time was how to persuade the Pope to abandon the fact that he controlled this territory in Central Italy, quite substantial area here. A large chunk had been lost in 1860 by the Pope. So by 1870 there was only this part of Italy that was left to be incorporated into the new Kingdom of Italy. And the elite from the Northwest was so convinced of the rightness of their cause that they even were willing to be subject to ex-communication from the church, from the Catholic Church, by the Pope, which is

what happened to them in exchange for unifying Italy, which was quite a cost to bear, so that the new king of Italy, for example, was not allowed to take mass, to go to church. And the Pope of course from 1870 until 1929 refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new state of Italy.

But lying behind it from this perspective was a process of trying to create an economic unit actually, not particularly a political unit. It was a very famous phrase used by an Italian politician in the 1860s, he said, “We have created Italy, now we must create the Italians,” the opposite way around from how we typically think of nation formation – nation-state formation. I think what’s interesting in this case is it’s a good example of how you can make an economic argument about national unification.

So the last example in relation to state and empire formation is about United States. And the Idea here is that – and this is in a postmodern perspective – originally the settlement was just along the coast. But in the geographical imagination of people like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, two of the founding fathers of the United States when it became independent from Britain in 1787, was to spread settlement beyond the Appalachian Mountains. Some of you may know that one of the objections that some of the American settlers had to British government policy after 1763 was that the British government insisted that Americans could not settle beyond the Appalachian Mountains, because of treaties that Britain had with France and with a variety of Indian nations beyond the Appalachian Mountains. But in the imagination, particularly of Madison, was the notion of creating a country that would expand westwards. And if we look at the map of the United States here you see this kind of inexorable movement from one coast to another. Now obviously some of these things were major historical contingencies, the fact, for example, that Napoleon in 1803 decided that he would sell this huge tract of land, the so-called Louisiana Purchase, to the United States, and so they acquired that without any kind of conquest at all.

But as you can see further to the West a lot

of this was either conquest, as in the case of the U.S.-Mexican War of 1847, or annexation of one kind or another. And lying behind this was a geographical imagination certainly at the founding, but by the 1840s this had actually become something called Manifest Destiny – I don’t know whether you are familiar with that phrase – that in a sense there was an inevitability to this [action] that the United States should stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and that it could in fact perhaps even stretch further north and also further south. So this was a process of both state and empire formation. I mean it was the creation of a huge continental state. But lying behind it was this perception, this conception, of a continent-wide state. So you can’t just see it as a kind of arbitrary accretion or bringing together pieces of territory, but that lying behind it was a justifying idea, the idea of an American empire which was a term that Jefferson used. And then by the 1840s this was destined to happen, as in the phrase Manifest Destiny.

3. Geography of social and political movements

So turning to the third subject area and this of course was a new one in the 1960s and 70s. Arguably the ones we’ve just been looking at had been part of political geography from the start. So what I have here or the first two are a couple of maps of the western parts of United States, of the Pacific states, California, Washington, Oregon, Hawaii and Alaska. And this first one is of changes in the vote between the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. And it’s an interesting – I thought this was an interesting example from a spatial-analytic perspective. And a lot of research in electoral geography is done from this perspective. So it’s about mapping the vote and then trying to correlate that vote with various characteristics of the districts where the vote went one way or the other.

So my example of a spatial-analytic approach would be to take a map like this – this is something I wrote in an atlas of the 2008 presidential election. So I wrote the chapter which was on these states, looking at all of the elections not just

the presidential one. But what was interesting about this for me from a spatial-analytic perspective was the contrast between all of them really and Alaska. So in all of them you really have what in electoral geography are called ‘swings’ that were more to Obama or more towards the Democrats and away from the Republicans. So the blue ones were significant swings between the 2004 and 2008 elections. And so they show areas that are becoming more like – more voting Democratic and the red and the light green ones are the ones where there was an increased votes for the Republicans. So there was some of that particularly in the interior parts of California and the interior parts of Oregon and Washington.

But what was most interesting was Alaska. And of course from a spatial-analytic perspective immediately you think “What is it that’s then different about Alaska from the other spatial units?” Well the answer’s very easy in this case. It’s the Vice Presidential candidate of the Republicans in 2008 was from Alaska. So this is what’s called in this tradition the friends and neighbors voting effect, it’s a neighborhood effect. So Sara Palin, you may remember her, was the Vice Presidential candidate of the Republicans for their sins, as I would say, and she of course was from near Anchorage in Alaska. So you can see here, you have a swing that goes in exactly the opposite direction from those towards Obama in many areas. Interestingly the part of Alaska where there’s a swing to Obama is the largely Inuit or indigenous people’s area over here and it was the part of Alaska that had been settled most by people from the lower, as they say, the lower 48 states who tended to vote in larger numbers for Senator McCain and Sara Palin. So from the spatial-analytic perspective then this would be the logic that you would use. You would look at areas that were anomalous and say “Well, why is that so different from all of the others?” and this would be the answer that you would come up with.

But from a political-economic perspective things could look very different. I mean here looking just at the 2008 election, in terms of popular vote by county. Classifying it this way one gets a

very different picture, particular here don’t focus so much on Alaska but focus on California and the other states. Things are more complicated than the first one makes it seem. In California, for example, there’s quite a contrast between coastal California, which is where I live, and interior California here. And anyone who’s ever been to California knows that this has become a major division. This is the most urbanized part, this is San Francisco, Bay Area, this is Los Angeles here, this is San Diego here. This is coastal California. Obviously it’s the most demographically mixed in terms of ethnicities, in terms of large immigrant communities especially people from Asia – from various Asian countries and from Latin America. The interior is much more homogenously white, mainly immigrants from other parts of the United States plus concentrations of people from Mexico who work in agribusiness, in agriculture.

So this is really a division between agricultural California, big, big agriculture in here and then the rest of California. And so the areas where agribusiness is strong in California in 2008 were the ones where there was in fact a majority of the vote for the Republican, even though there was a swing to Obama from 2004 to 2008. So what’s interesting here is that there’s an economic pattern here. It’s not about friends and neighbors voting except there’s still a little bit of that here obviously, but everywhere else it’s not about some kind of uniform swing that just fits a national pattern, it’s very much about economic differences. So economic differences here, the nature of the local economy, the nature of the local population is what is driving votes, not some communication pattern or some anomaly, just some kind of anomaly as in this case.

And so the final example of the postmodern one focuses more on the rhetoric and claims of politicians and their efforts at cultivating identities. So I mean, if you’re following the recent American presidential campaign for 2016, you know the degree to which they are all set of cultural themes that are driving the candidates, ones relating to things like immigration, for example, or cultural issues like abortion or same-sex marriage and what have you. So here the focus is very much

upon the campaign, the political rhetoric and political campaigns and particularly what different politicians promise to different constituencies. So this is a particularly California theme because we have at the moment a tremendous shortage of water, because of the drought in the American west. And so in California at the moment many of us would vote for someone who guarantees us all of affordable air and affordable water, especially the latter one.

And so the postmodern perspective says, “Don’t just look at the map, look at how people are trying to mobilize.” Here the focus is on mobilizing people, forming different kinds of social and political movements, for example, in American politics these days the so-called ‘Tea Party Movement’ has been very important within the Republican Party but isn’t really part of the party which has now become a real problem because their two main candidates are Trump and Carson who the mainstream Republicans I think are really very worried will become the Republican candidate. So here the idea is “How do politicians appeal to different constituencies?” but also more “How do social and political movements articulate their goals?” and “How are they different from the others?” and in particular “How do they do this geographically?” “Which constituencies are they appealing to in different places?” because, as you probably know, I mean particularly in American context presidential elections are not really just selections about who gets the most votes but it’s about where you get the votes as well. So Al Gore, some of you may remember, won more votes than George W. Bush did nationally in 2000, but he still lost the election because the election is decided on a state-by-state basis, adding across the states rather than in terms of who got the largest number of popular votes.

4. Places and political identities

Let me try and be a bit briefer with some of these other, so we can go through them quickly. In terms of places and political identities, here you have to guess where this is. So this is a map of Belgium and so in this case what we have is a language map of Belgium, so the part on here is

the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, the red area is the French speaking part and the Blue is the German speaking part, which is relatively minor. And then in the middle here on this island is Brussels, which is an increasingly multi-cultural city and a city that’s separate really from the rest of Belgium. That’s the Brussels metropolitan area, by the way, not just the municipality. Why? Of course the history of Belgium is of being in between France and the Netherlands especially, and the great powers essentially creating Belgium. So Belgium again is not a creation from some kind of bottom up nationalism. Who are the most famous Belgians that you can think of? I mean there aren’t very many, Hercule Poirot, the hero of Agatha Christie’s stories. But only because he doesn’t live in Belgium, he lives in London. So the further away you are from Belgium the more likely you are to identify as a Belgian, I think. But in Belgium people don’t think that much that way. They think that they are Flemish or they are Walloon. This is the language that they use, Dutch-speaking or French-speaking. And so there’s a very strong association between where you are from in Belgium then and your political identity. And this means that the Belgian identity is extremely weak. It’s a very weak national identity and where you have a very, very strong regional identities here. And so in a spatial-analytic perspective what one sees is that – one looks again for anomalies and it’s Brussels that is the anomaly here, that doesn’t really fit in and [in] the rest of the country you really do have these two competing political identities that are very strongly attached to particular regions and Brussels where it doesn’t really work, it doesn’t really operate.

So that is a neat kind of mapping of language onto political identity. So here we have – this is a photograph of two guys in South Central Los Angeles. This is the district of Watts in Los Angeles. This is or historically was very much an African-American or black neighborhood, very high levels of racial segregation. 95%-98% of the population in this area historically was African-American and really marginalized within the economy of Los Angeles. So until the 1960s there

were many jobs in manufacturing industries located close to this area. But in the 1970s and 1980s most of these factories closed down; they disappeared. So from a political-economic perspective what one sees is the neighborhood like this not only got a high level of residential segregation but also very low levels of employment. The majority of the population today in this neighborhood is either unemployed or works in the so-called underground economy but marginalized within the larger metropolitan area.

And so the political identity of people in a neighborhood like this is very much those of people who find themselves on the edge of the rest of society. So electoral participation, for example, is very, very low; very few people participate in national elections. So for example, even in 2012 when the candidate was African-American, Barack Obama, the turnout in this area was less than 15%. So this [is] a measure of a degree of political demoralization of a political feeling on the edge of national politics. And in fact in this neighborhood the only time that tends to mobilize people politically is when there is some kind of event like shooting by the police or some other activity that then mobilizes people, usually in relation to the police force. So the political identity here is of people embattled against mainstream society. This neighborhood where this photograph was taken is just a few streets north of the district of Los Angeles called Compton. So anyone who knows the history of rap music knows about Compton because this is where many of the early important rap artists, hip-hop musicians at least on the West Coast – West Coast rap were from this district, which again, if you know the lyrics of the rap songs you'll know that it has a political message but it's one that relates to being marginalized politically through the places in which people find themselves living.

The final set of example of place and political identity is also here taken from Los Angeles. So the red area on the small map is Los Angeles County and then this is the county, up large here, and circled here is one particular area which was historically what is called, in American local government language, unincorporated, which meant

that it didn't have its own local government at all, in this case, until 1984. And this is a district in Los Angeles called West Hollywood. So it's right next to Beverly Hills, Beverly Hills is here, which is one of the most affluent neighborhoods in Los Angeles. This is Santa Monica here; this is where I live, right there. And so West Hollywood for many years was – all the services were provided by the county. So the police was the Sheriff, the fire department was the county, and so it didn't have its own services at all. And so it was incorporated in 1984.

What's interesting here is about how this happened. And this is a history of an area that the main people who were behind this were a group of gay men, of men who had moved to this neighborhood partly because you have to – one has to acknowledge historically it was not policed very heavily by either the Los Angeles police department or by the Beverly Hills police department. And so it was an area that it attracted, over the years, a fairly significant number of people who you could regard and have thought of themselves as having been rejected by the mainstream society. But they made an effort and were successful in the 1980s in creating a new municipality of West Hollywood. So today for example, the Mayor of West Hollywood and most of the councilors are gay. So what we have here is the creation in a sense of using a place as a mechanism to try and make an identity, in this case a political identity, it's not just a cultural one but a political identity legitimate – about in a sense trying to legitimize a group who otherwise would be regarded or historically anyway in the United States have been regarded as illegitimate. So it's an interesting example. I would hasten to say there aren't that many examples like this, but it shows how a place can become a mechanism for creating and legitimizing a particular identity.

5. Geographies of nationalism and ethnic conflict

So finally then [we move to] the three examples of looking at the geographies of nationalism and ethnic conflict from the three perspectives. Here's another of these sort of blank maps. In this

case, this is the regions of Spain. And of course, from this perspective what's interesting is why some regions like Catalonia here – the Basque Provinces here, and to a lesser extent Galicia up here. These are the regions in Spain where you actually have autonomist and sometimes separatist movements. And now from a spatial-analytic perspective the interest is more “Why are these all peripheral?” So the tendency is to think of it in terms of, again, geographical peripherality. Catalonia on the border, obviously, with France and the Basque provinces also looking out towards across the Bay of Biscay and then Galicia being very close to Portuguese and in fact Galician language not being that distinctive from Portuguese.

So you've got these rather peripheral regions and historically you've had a very centralized government particularly during the Franco period. So from 1939, 1940 until 1974, Spain had a very, very centralized system. But before that time the system had been much looser and so Catalonia and Basque provinces which speak really quite different languages from mainstream Spanish or Castilian, those two regions had a degree of local autonomy. So following the changes of 1974 to 1976, there was a decision made to in fact evolve powers particularly to these regions, to the Basque province and to Catalonia. Partly this was the reaction to the already existing and insurgency amongst the Basques. So there had been a violent guerilla movement in the 1960s and 1970s that was trying to undermine the rule of the central government over the Basque region. But the general emphasis here will be placed on the peripherality of the distance to Madrid and the history of some kind of pre-existing self-rule in these regions compared to the rest of Spain. And that would be the explanation.

And using the Italian example for the second perspective, this is the percentage of the vote achieved by the Italian Northern League in 2008 national election. And you can see here, I mean the Northern League was founded really in the early 1980s but really only came to the fore in the 1990s, at that time separatist movement had since changed its rhetoric enormously to become

an anti-immigrant party more recently. But back in – as recently as 2008 it still officially had a policy of separating Northern Italy, which they called Padania, from the rest of Italy and you can see here the relative levels of support in Northern and Central Italy. Well, this movement was very open; it was actually based around economic issues. It was based around the fact that this is the richest part of Italy, by far, and a lot of their tax revenues were being collected and then were being sent southwards to Southern Italy and to the islands, which are much poorer parts of the country.

So their argument was against that. They were the Italy that produces. That was the argument that they used and that Rome was a thief. They had this catch phrase, “Roma Ladrona,” which in translation means Rome, the thief – Rome as the capital city sucking in resources from the north and then sending them south, and partly this reflected the nature of Italian politics. The exchange politics or clientelism was much stronger in Southern Italy than it was in the north, but it also reflected the fact that any nation state redistributes some of the wealth from richer regions to poor ones. But in this case it was really very much an economic based movement even in its own rhetoric. So the argument here would be from a political-economic perspective that the Italy – the most productive part of Italy was in a sense turning against the other part of the country because the redistributive powers of the state in a sense now outstripped the legitimacy – the political legitimacy of the state in taking those revenues and redistributing them to poorer people and to the poorer region. Yes, I should have said that this is also in the context where Italy is actually in a period of economic decline. And so many of the industries in the north are feeling very embattled, many of their products are now faced with competition from China and so on and some of the firms themselves are now off shoring to Eastern Europe or to China as well.

So the third example is – back again, this is the postmodern sort of approach to nationalism, is to focus much more again on what is at stake here in terms of people's representations of themselves

and of the past. And in a lot of work in political geography the focus is on what in French are often called like ‘lieux de mémoire,’ places of memory, the ways in which the nation or the group, if it’s a regional group, is remembered and commemorated. And of course one of the important points to grasp I think about nationalism is that commemoration and celebration are very closely connected to one another. Remembering past events isn’t just important in its own right, but in a sense it’s also about then celebrating those events as well. Now trying to separate out these two things is of course very difficult.

This is the Cenotaph, which is in Whitehall in London and it has various flags of the British Air Force, the Army and the Navy here. And on the side its written, which is similar to ones you find in other countries, “our glorious dead,” the people who died in previous wars fighting for the nation, and we’re all familiar with this. This is like an equivalent of – this is the London shrine, if you like, for the remembering, particularly World War I but also other wars as well including colonial wars. So this is a place where in a sense – this is the focal point of memory, a focal point of memory of the nation and of its past. And partly, it’s about commemoration and I think many of us don’t have so much problem with that. It’s more when it switches from commemoration to celebration that in a sense then it’s about reproducing the same sort of historic sentiments as well. And I think the postmodern approach to nationalism then tends to focus on the buildings, the very specific sites in which memory – in which commemoration takes place. So commemoration – so in a sense trying to reconstruct the representations that lie at the heart of nationalism, which is an appeal to a collective past and in particular to collective sacrifice. Collective sacrifice, in a sense then justifies the continuing existence of the nation, that’s the minimal expectation, but then also the celebration of the nation as well.

V. Emerging themes

1. Geographical scale

So I hope those examples helped to illustrate the connection between the sub areas – on the subject areas on the one hand and then the theoretical perspectives that have I think been dominant in American political geography over the last 30 or 40 years – so I’m sorry, it feels like maybe I’ve been here for 30 or 40 years. What I wanted to do at the close though is to point to some things that it isn’t – the field isn’t just sort of fixed; it’s always moving, which is why the title of the book is *Making Political Geography* in the sense that it’s always a project in formation. And I just wanted to identify what I think are three of the most important – and I don’t mean to suggest that they’re the only ones, but in addition to what we’ve been talking about increasingly in the American literature in political geography, these are the three of the themes that I think have become most significant, particularly over the last 10 years or so. I think I had a bit of a better discussion earlier on here.

So these three themes are ‘geographical scale,’ ‘politics of the environment’ and – it’s what I’m going to call ‘normative political geography.’ So if you look at the main journals today like *Political Geography* or *Geopolitics, Space and Polity* in the English language journals, you’ll see these are – increasingly these are beginning to appear alongside all of the things that I’ve just been talking about. One of these – which is in essence a kind of, what you can call like, meta-theoretical issue, as much as a substantive area or a subject area is thinking with geographical scale. So this is more in terms of how to think about things more than something in itself. And here one can think of various topics that could be addressed. I’ll give an example of terrorism in a minute, addressed using geographical scale. That may be better than thinking entirely just in terms of a world that’s sort of flat, where there are no differences between the local, the national, the global and so on. What I have in mind here is the idea that the human behavior, human action, is

always framed in a kind of telescopic way. And some of the terms we use are conventions like local or regional or national or international or global. I mean, so the language itself is one that we've inherited.

But often these are pretty good surrogates for levels or scales at which things happen differentially. And so we know there are things that are where the cause is or the reasons for things are just local. And we know there are other things that in essence are the result of causes operating from a larger scale and then having local consequences. And so here the idea is if we think with scale, we can end up with rather better explanations than if we think just at the state level, just at the local level and so on. And one of the issues here is that most of the social sciences are set up at a particular scale. Think of a field like political science which arguably is close to political geography. There you have people who studied the politics of particular countries, Japanese politics, American politics and so on. Sometimes, they just look at the country as a whole, sometimes they are a bit more sensitive to local, regional and national levels, but typically they look at national institutions. Then you have specialists in comparative politics who compare countries to one another. So we compare Japan to the United States or we compare Italy to Britain or whatever. And then we have the field of international politics or international relations which operates largely – I'm pleased to say not entirely anymore, but largely at the level of states, talking in terms of states that bang up against one another.

And so that's the intellectual division of labor that we've come to have. I think one of the great contributions of geography in general and political geography more specifically is to, in a sense, try and introduce geographical scale into these different fields, to point out there really isn't – I mean there's not just the Japanese politics. Just think, for example, of a lot of the most important issues at the moment in Japanese politics, ones relating to things like the base – the U.S. marine base in Okinawa or questions relating to the policies of The Bank of Japan, in terms of setting interest rates or so-called quantitative easing.

These are questions that don't just involve Japan but the governor of The Bank of Japan of course spends a lot of time consulting with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in the United States and the head of the European Central Bank and so on.

So the point I'm trying to make is that there isn't this kind of essential independence at a certain scale of these different units and yet we've become trapped in this. And this was – I wrote a paper in the early 1990s called the territorial trap which was essentially – it was directed more at the field of international relations than it was anywhere else, but it was in a sense arguing that we can't think of what happens out in the world, as if it was always in terms of these levels – these levels are not separate from one another and we need to acknowledge them and to understand that what happens anywhere in relation to a particular phenomenon is always being funneled or channeled in some way across these scales. This is a difficult topic to deal with.

So the second – well, I'll come back and go through – do you want me to go through the example now for terrorism? So I have an example of each of these. So let's look at the terrorism one that I use. If you just look at it locally, this is a map of Africa, of people killed in conflicts involving so-called jihadists, however that's classified in Africa, from 2009 to 2015. This is from *The Economist* magazine, the London magazine. And what it shows are particularly these two large concentrations, one in Nigeria or almost entirely actually in the northeastern region of Nigeria, so not in the whole of Nigeria at all, and then the other in Somalia and over the border into Kenya. And you can see here in terms of numbers, these two completely outnumber the others in terms of the significance. At least in as far as numbers of people killed they are the most important, and the other ones are scattered and perhaps less important.

Well, for one strategy [it] would be just to focus on the local origins of these movements. You would say "Well, this is largely to do with the failed state of Somalia, the collapse of Somalia and the rise of Islamist movements

in Somalia.” Boko Haram has much more to do with actually between – and this would be the local level explanation – enmities between Christians and Moslems in Nigeria and particularly in Northeastern Nigeria. So that would be a complete local or completely local story or local account. And actual fact [is that] if we look further into these groups one discovers that, for example, most of their funding comes from outside of these regions. They are funded largely by money from Saudi Arabia and from the Gulf states. There’s lots of evidence of this in terms of buying weapons and so on and so forth. So there are these external linkages. And you can see this, you could say “Well, that’s a network effect.” I mean you could definitely think of it that way, but in many ways what you have are really tiers or levels of responsibility, because the same people in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states who are financing these people are also financing other people in other places as well. And so they are higher up a hierarchy. One of the things that geographical scale helps us, I think, with is this notion that we actually don’t live in a flat world, we live in a very hierarchical world. We live in a world in which many powerful powers in a sense are a kind of descent across scales from particular nodes, from particular places. But this is not what in Internet terms is called a reticular network. This is a hierarchical network. So some nodes are much more important than others and we can think of those as being at a higher scale than the others, so one part of this is definitely that, it’s this funding relationship.

But also these groups, as you may be aware, have branded themselves in global terms. Neither of these now refers to themselves entirely as local activists or local operatives. Both of them have in a sense identified either with Al Qaeda or with the Islamic State, over the last six months or so. So they’re in fact branding themselves as global brands. So even though they are operating in these very particular settings, these local settings, and the local causes are still important, that’s not point, those things matter enormously. But they’re also parts of this larger, overarching hierarchical system. So if you want to really

understand them, you have to understand that. You can’t just look at them at one particular scale. It’s got to be across all of these scales if you want to effectively understand them. Part of our problem at the moment from a kind of policy point of view is that we don’t do this. We think of them all either as completely isolated with local causes or we think of them as just a giant global enterprise, when in fact it’s neither of those things. It’s something in between.

2. Politics of the environment

So the second emerging theme is – and there’s some irony in this given that in many ways political geography came out of an environmental determinist tradition in the late 19th century but now we’ve discovered the opposite relationship, the degree to which humans in a sense are now affecting the global environment and the consequences of that for the future. And there are number of examples here, many of which you’re probably familiar with. One of the most important ones is the focus on what now is called environmental security. So, this is like “What’s going to be the political consequences of climate change?” for example, “Which parts of the world are more likely to be affected by this?” – presumably more lower lying areas where regions somewhere like Bangladesh would be a good case, but then “What are the longer term consequences of that in terms of political impacts, in terms of what will happen to the people who are affected by this?” and so on. So that’s certainly one side of it.

Then there’s so-called green geopolitics or which often is attached to questions of environmental movements or environmental movements geared towards trying to make environmental issues more important on political agendas, and then finally, one issue that became particularly important in China in the early 2000 is the whole question – well, generally – of pollution, air pollution and water pollution, but more specifically of the pollution of the global food chain. The degree to which there’re increased toxic elements in the food that we consume, partly is a product of the scale at which food now is being produced and moved over long distances and so on. So there are

any number of these. I have an example. This is only one example of this, what I'm interested in, which from a geopolitical point of view is particularly interesting.

This is a series of maps of what I call the plastic mattresses or plastic concentrations in the various oceans. The top one is the Pacific, the second one is the Atlantic, and the third one is the Indian Ocean. And what these maps show is the relative density and circulation of what are mainly plastic materials, but there's also other stuff that gets trapped in this, plastic bottles, little bits of plastic, micro plastics of one kind or another and how these circulate. Now, I'm not particularly either equipped intellectually or that interested in the actual physical geography of these things. What interests me is the whole question of the governance or regulational lack thereof, of these particular spaces. As you know, even though we have economic zones around particular countries, there is really no essential authority over the oceans or over the water. And so essentially these have become like dumping grounds for the refuse of modern industrial society.

So the question arises, "How can we invent governance mechanisms or regulatory mechanisms to try and address problems like this, problems that transcend any particular country's borders?" because, as we know, effectively in the world today environmental regulation is either done by national or local governments or it's not done at all. And so this is an example, a good one, I think, of how there is a mismatch between a major global problem on the one hand and in our capacity, politically and governmentally to address that question on the other, which is why we end up then with all this stuff being dumped in what is a common resource, whatever. But rather like the air where we pump all kinds of stuff into it and don't address the question of how that then has consequences for people at some distance away, so we do this into the oceans. So this is a particularly dramatic example I think of an environmental problem that needs to be addressed politically and governmentally.

3. Normative political geography

And the final emerging theme as I see it in American political geography is this focus on what have often been important questions in political theory, which have never really been addressed as geographical questions, so-called normative political geography, by which I mean very obvious questions of values, questions of judgment about what is right or wrong, for example – so questions of ethical, making ethical distinctions and so on. One area where there's been quite a lot of writing recently is on so-called transnational democracy, which is "Would this necessarily have to take very territorialized forms?" for example, "Would it have to be a global federalism?" or something like that. Well, I and other people have made arguments very much against that kind of model and argued much more for functionally specific sorts of democracy, governance over certain kinds of networks, for example. So if you're interested in questions relating to foreign investment, for example, across countries and the current or complete absence of any sort of democratic accountability for that, if that's of something that interests you, then the question is "How would one go about instituting some kind of institutional mechanisms for regulating that across different countries?" and so on. But that strikes to me as being a more useful strategy than thinking up some kind of scaled-up version of the nation state for the world as a whole. But that would be an example of a kind of normative theorizing about how to organize democracy.

Secondary, what's been very important in contemporary geography is the discussion of new kinds of weapons and in particular, many of you are probably familiar with this, the use of the drone – of drones as a substitute for human forces, but increasingly also discussions of robotic forces and so on as well and raising issues about the use of those weapons which seem to devolve responsibility then onto machines and away from humans. But also there's been quite a bit of writing recently about things like aerial bombing or bombardment, which has become increasingly the *modus operandi*, particularly of the American military. So for example, the interventions

recently in Syria and Iraq have largely taken the form of bombing.

But anyone who knows much about the history of bombing knows that actually its often quite ineffective as a military strategy in terms of meeting different kinds of objectives. And so there's a quite a lot of discussion of these kinds of things and particularly, given that this is a political geographical discussion, questions relating to how this shrinks distance, how these weapons can be manipulated over long distances, for example. The pilots of drones – many of the drones operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan or so on – are actually located in Nevada in the United States. So there's this huge physical distance between the controller on the one hand and then the outcome, if you like, on the other. This is an instance where warfare now is being, in a sense, fought at a distance.

And then the final two examples I have are “Why should we care about people who we don't know?” I mean this may sound like a very banal question, but why should we care for distant strangers? This was a question that the great political theorists always asked in the Scottish Enlightenment, people like David Hume and Adam Smith. Shouldn't we just care about people around about us? David Hume had this idea of concentric zones, and we all do this. I mean, we care more for our children and for obvious reason and for our families and so on. But do our responsibilities extend beyond those, the familial kin, the national and so on out into the rest of the world? And some people have been making the argument – not just a utilitarian type of argument, which is that it's good for us to care about other people because in a sense, there's a *quid pro quo*. If we care for them, they'll care for us. But in a way there's a kind of basic humanity that demands that if other people are systematically degraded in some way. This arises in connection with the whole refugee issue in Europe and in relation to American policies on taking refugees. Particularly, what's your moral responsibility if you start a war and then don't take the refugees from it? I mean these are normative questions, these are questions of morality but they also

are ones that arise in very specific geographical contexts when we are tied someway to people at some distance away from us.

And so these are difficult questions, in a sense you could say there's no one answer to any of these, but these are questions that increasingly people are wanting to ask. And then finally, one area where I've actually been more and more interested in is the question of what can be called the geopolitics of knowledge. I'm here today talking about American political geography. Well, why should you care about American political geography? In a way, there's a kind of interesting geopolitical issue here which is that in many ways it's the world's most powerful universities, it's the most powerful states. They are the ones that in many ways produce the knowledge that then circulates around the world. And I mean sometimes it actually may be good knowledge, my point isn't that it's therefore always tainted as knowledge, that it's always like bad knowledge because it's from Harvard or somewhere other. My point is more that it means that certain knowledge gets way far more attention than other knowledge does, simply because of where it comes from and who articulates it and who spreads it.

And so my interest is in really addressing this question, more especially, in my case to ideas about international relations and global politics and so on, but more how should we not listen to voices from other places and how can those voices be incorporated, given for example the hegemony of English, which is our challenge today. You know, he speaks in English and Takashi has to translate it into Japanese. Now on one level some of this communication is always going to be inevitable. There is always a question of translation, but if it is always a question of translating from English into something else, then that's a problem. That's the point that I am trying to make. It should be more of a two-way street. So that was the last thing.

I had an example of this which is more about ideas that we are living increasingly just in one world. When people talk about the Internet in a very idealistic way, increased planetary consciousness, we are all on this planet together

even though there are people who want to go Mars, most of us think that our future is here. But in fact, if you look at the email traffic and a colleague of mine, actually in physics produced this mainly from getting information from servers all over the world on email traffic. And then he classified it. He was trying to look at this sort of clash of civilizations idea. There are essentially these kinds of global-cultural groups: Chinese, Islamic and so on. After a while, this classification breaks down. It is incoherent classification, I think. You know African is a locational attribute not a cultural one.

But anyway, if you do code them on here, you see that there is an incredible amount of clustering still, that there is still an immense geography in the network sense to the way in which email works. One of the most clustered is Latin-American here which formed its own sub-graph, and it does say a lot of them have other linkages but the densest linkages tend to be between neighbors still, between adjacent countries. There are some interesting – and Japan is interesting. You will see up here because Japan actually is much more, in terms of email traffic, cosmopolitan or staying anywhere else on Earth in terms of linkages to East Asia, to North America and to Europe and so on, and so it is unclassifiable. But most countries, in fact, fit very much into these kinds of classifications. And so this is obviously linguistic. In case of Latin America, it is mainly Spanish-speaking countries, but it is also more than that. There is also a very, very strong geographical element to this. That always suggests that we actually still don't live in a world that is singular where we have the world as an entire pinhead or something single point. But in fact, it is still very geographically structured.

And from a normative point of view, this is very interesting because it suggests that there are still things that need to be done. I mean, if people are living very much in more limited communication networks, then that obviously poses a challenge to creating any kind of sense of greater planetary consciousness. So there are possibilities here that more empirically informed research helps us then in exploring these more normative questions

about global consciousness, global sense of belonging and so on. What this suggests is that people still are very much locked in to very specific types of communication network and they were all the examples that I had. So, thank you.

編集者解題

本稿は、2015年11月28日に大阪市立大学文化交流センターで開催されたジョン・アグニュー教授(カリフォルニア大学ロサンゼルス校地理学部)による講演「空間はどのように政治に影響するかーアメリカ政治地理学の主題」の録音記録に、本誌掲載のための若干の修正を加えたものである。ジョン・アグニュー教授は1949年英国生まれで、現在、カリフォルニア大学ロサンゼルス校の地理学部教授を務める。1980年代以降の英語圏を代表する政治地理学者であり、専門は場所の政治論、(批判)地政学、イタリアの地方政治、領土・主権論など多岐にわたる。2008年から09年まで全米地理学者協会会長を歴任し、著書は*Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Allen and Unwin, 1987)、*Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics* (Routledge, 2003)、*Making Political Geography* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012)など多数にのぼる。

講演は、欧米の政治地理学史を概観した上で、*Making Political Geography*で展開された、政治地理学における「空間分析」、「政治経済」、「ポストモダン」という3つの理論的視角を縦糸に、「地政学」、「国家と帝国の空間的・領域的編成」、「社会・政治運動の地理」、「場所と政治的アイデンティティ」、「ナショナリズムとエスニック紛争の地理」という5つの研究領域を横糸として、豊富かつ具体的な事例を用いて解説された。さらに、新しく現れてきた主題として「地理的スケール」、「環境の政治」、「規範政治地理学」に関する説明が加えられ、アグニュー教授からみた現代政治地理学の課題も提示された。このように講演は、政治地理学がいかに世界の地政学的文脈と不可分であるかを学史的に明らかにしつつ、1960代から80年代にかけての英米において、混沌とし始めた社会の要請として「復興」していく政治地理学を体系的に詳らかにするものであった。

なお、編集者が講演本文に付記した部分は[]で示した。講演で用いられた地図や写真は著作権の関係で掲載を控えた。